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 EVERY DAY COUNTS:  PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE 
IDEA’S DUE PROCESS STRUCTURE 
 
Elizabeth A. Shaver* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is a core principle of special education legislation that the parents 
of children with disabilities can challenge the child’s educational 
programming through an administrative due process hearing.  Yet, for 
years the special education due process structure has been criticized as 
inefficient, anti-collaborative, and prohibitively expensive.  Those criticisms 
have given rise to widely varying proposals to reform special education due 
process, proposals that range from adding certain alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms to a wholesale replacement of the due process 
structure.   
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of special education 
dispute resolution.  The article first examines the lively debate among 
scholars and special interest groups about perceived deficiencies of IDEA 
due process and various proposals to remedy those deficiencies.  The 
article then sets forth the results of a nationwide survey in which over three 
hundred and fifty special education attorneys voiced their opinions about 
the current structure and some proposals for reform.  Finally, the article 
recommends certain structural changes to IDEA due process that are 
designed to improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of special education 
dispute resolution. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ability of parents to challenge the educational programming of a 
child with a disability is crucial, since every day that a child does not 
receive an appropriate education is a day of learning that is lost forever.  For 
this reason, it has long been a fixture of special education law that parents 
are entitled to a due process hearing in which they can advocate for the 
needs of their child.1   
* Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, The University of Akron School of Law; J.D. 
The Cornell Law School; B.A. Vanderbilt University.  I would like to thank Sarah Morath, 
Mark Weber and Phil Carino for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.  I extend 
special thanks to Daniel Glass for his invaluable work on this article. 
1 See, e.g., Penna Ass’n. of Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. 
                                                 
2 EVERY DAY COUNTS [] 
A special education dispute should be resolved quickly to ensure 
that the child receives appropriate educational services at the earliest 
possible date.2  An equally important goal is that special education due 
process is accessible to all children with disabilities regardless of family 
wealth.  Yet critics argue that special education due process currently does 
not serve these goals, either because of the lack of “collaborative and non-
adversarial”3 means for families and school districts to resolve disputes 
quickly or the prohibitive costs associated with due process.4  
In 2004, when Congress last amended the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Congress found that parents and school 
districts needed “expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in 
positive and constructive ways.”5  To accomplish this goal, Congress added 
or expanded alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms that are 
triggered once a due process complaint is filed.  IDEA now requires the 
parties to attend a “resolution session” that must take place within 15 days 
after a due process complaint is filed, unless both parties agree to waive the 
session.6  IDEA also provides expanded opportunities to mediate a special 
education dispute.7  Both the resolution session and mediation can delay an 
adjudicated resolution of the dispute.8   
Advocacy organizations and scholars contend that, even with these 
dispute resolution mechanisms in place, special education dispute resolution 
still is too expensive and time-consuming.  School administrators assert that 
the litigation costs are so high that school districts often agree to provide 
services not required by IDEA.9  Advocates for children and parents 
contend that due process is too expensive for most parents, who cannot 
afford to pay the attorneys and expert witnesses whose participation is 
Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC]; Mills v. Bd. of Ed. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 
874-76 (D.D.C. 1972) [hereinafter Mills]; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1415 (2012). 
2 A special education dispute should be resolved through an administrative due process 
hearing in no more than seventy-five days.  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b) (2007) (setting 30-
day period for resolution session); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (2007) (setting 45-day timeline 
hearing officer to render a decision).   
3 Philip Moses & Timothy Heeden, Collaborating for Our Children’s Future:  
Mediating Special Education Disputes, 18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 5 (Summer 2012). 
4 Part II., infra.  
5 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8) (2012).   
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2012). 
7 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2012). 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(c)(3) (2012). 
9 Sasha Pudelski, Rethinking Special Education Due Process, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. 
ADM’RS, 2 (April 2013), 
http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Speci
al_Education/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf.   
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essential in a due process hearing.10    
The continued debate over the structure of IDEA due process has 
yielded widely-varying proposals for reform.  Some advocates propose that 
IDEA should include ADR mechanisms in addition to the resolution session 
and mediation.11  Others propose increased governmental enforcement of 
IDEA’s provisions or expanded low-cost or pro bono legal services for 
lower income parents.12  At least one special interest group, the American 
Association of School Administrators (AASA), has proposed a radical 
overhaul of due process procedures in which the parties must engage in 
several mandatory procedures before litigation can be filed.13  Still others 
propose that the due process structure essentially remain the same, with 
only modest reforms designed to increase efficiency and reduce cost.14 
This article explores the merits of these various proposals to reform 
special education dispute resolution.  As part of this exploration, the article 
includes the results of a survey that asked special education attorneys about 
the current structure and certain proposals to modify the structure.  Finally, 
the article recommends certain structural changes designed to reduce the 
expense and time needed to resolve a special education dispute.   
Part I of the article provides historical background on special 
education due process and a description of IDEA’s current due process 
procedures.  Part II of the article describes the ongoing debate about the 
efficacy and accessibility of due process and the various proposals for 
change.  Part III of the article describes the results of a nationwide survey of 
special education practitioners regarding the current structure and some of 
the proposals for change.  Part IV of the article recommends certain 
structural changes to due process procedures. 
At the end of the day, regardless whether the parties use ADR 
mechanisms to settle a dispute or adjudicate the dispute in a due process 
hearing, the ultimate goal is to resolve special education disputes quickly 
and efficiently so that the child’s education does not suffer.  The IDEA 
10 Elisa Hyman, et. al., How IDEA Fails Families without Means:  Causes and 
Corrections From the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. 
& POL’Y & L. 107, 112-13 (2011). 
11 Tracy C. Mueller, IEP Facilitation:  A Promising Approach to Resolving Conflicts 
Between Parents and Families, 41 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 60 (Jan/Feb. 2009) 
(discussing IEP facilitation); S, James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Process, 21 J. NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 544 (2012) (proposing that 
IDEA include a process for voluntary, binding arbitration). 
12 See Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty and The Limits of Private 
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1430-33 (2011). 
13 Pudelski, supra note 9. 
14 Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
495 (2014). 
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procedures should ensure that, for the child, every day of school counts.  
 
I. IDEA’S DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES. 
 
A.  Early Origins of Special Education Due Process. 
 
Before 1975, federal law did not provide children with disabilities in 
the United States with the right to attend public school, although some 
states did provide special education services.15  In the early 1970s, 
advocates for children with disabilities won two key cases16 by drawing 
heavily from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education,17 in which the Court ruled that racially-segregated education 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
two landmark cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children 
(PARC) v. Pennsylvania18 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of 
Columbia,19  established, among other rights, that parents of a child with a 
disability would be entitled to “notice” and “an opportunity to be heard” 
whenever educators made decisions about educational services for the child.   
Robust due process rights were a key focus of both the PARC and 
Mills cases because then-existing state statutes and school policies allowed 
school districts to exclude from public school any child deemed 
“uneducable,” without any notice to or input from the child’s parents.20  In 
the PARC case, the parties executed a Consent Agreement that set forth 
very detailed due process provisions.  Parents were entitled to receive 
written notice whenever a school district proposed to initiate or change 
special education services.21  The Consent Agreement provided that the 
notice would: 
 
• “[D]escribe the proposed action in detail,” including, among other 
things, a “statement of the reasons” for the proposed action and 
information about any “tests or reports” upon which the proposed 
action was based;22 
15 Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A 
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 355 (1990). 
16 PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279; Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866. 
17 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
18 343 F. Supp. 279. 
19 348 F. Supp. 866. 
20 See, e.g., PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282 n.3 (quoting Pennsylvania statutes that 
permitted a school district to exclude a child from school if a  school psychologist 
determined that the child was “uneducable or untrainable”). 
21 Id. at 303-05. 
22 Id. at 304. 
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• Inform parents of their right to a hearing before any proposed action 
would take place;23 
• Inform parents of their rights (a) to have counsel (or any other 
person) at the hearing, (b) to review the child’s school records, 
including any tests or reports upon which the proposed action was 
based, (c) to present any evidence at the hearing, including expert 
medical, psychological and educational testimony, and (d) to call as 
a witness any school official, employee, or agent of a school 
district;24 and 
• Inform parents of the procedures by which they could pursue a 
hearing, among other items.25  
The PARC Consent Agreement further specified how the hearing was to 
be conducted.26  The hearing was to be scheduled between fifteen and thirty 
days after receipt of the parents’ request for a hearing.27  The hearing officer 
was to be “the Secretary of Education,” or a person designated by the 
Secretary, but could not be “an officer, employee or agent” of the school 
district.28  The hearing officer’s decision was to be based “solely upon the 
evidence presented” and the hearing officer must have found that the 
proposed change was supported by “substantial evidence” presented at the 
hearing.29  The parents had a right to be represented at the hearing and to 
present any evidence or testimony, including expert medical, psychological 
or educational testimony.30  The hearing officer was to render a decision 
within twenty days after the hearing, and the decision was to contain 
“written findings of fact and conclusions of law.31  The parents were 
entitled to a transcript of the hearing record.32  Importantly, the child’s 
educational status could not change during the notice and hearing process, 
except in “extraordinary circumstances” after written notice to and approval 
by a representative of the state board of education.33  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 304-05. 
27 Id. at 305. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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B.  Congress Enacts Special Education Legislation. 
 
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act (EAHCA), which provided federal funding for special education 
services.34  The EAHCA conditioned the States’ receipt of federal funding 
upon compliance with the statute’s requirement that each child with a 
disability receive a “free appropriate public education,” or FAPE.35  
Through the EAHCA, Congress leveraged its Spending Clause powers to 
essentially require all States to provide special education services to 
children with disabilitiesb.36  
The EAHCA represented the culmination of several years of federal 
legislative activity in the field of special education.  Congress first provided 
federal funds for states to develop special education programs as early as 
1965, when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA).37  In 1966, Congress added Title VI to the ESEA, entitled 
“Education of the Handicapped Children.”38  Among other things, then-
Title VI established a Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped and a 
National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children.39  In 1970, 
Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act,40 which 
consolidated prior federal legislation regarding special education initiatives 
into one piece of legislation.41   
In 1974, after the PARC and Mills cases were decided, Congress 
amended the Education of the Handicapped Act to provide due process 
rights to parents of children with disabilities.42  In considering those 
amendments, Congress reviewed the PARC and Mills decisions as well as 
reports and scholarly articles on the topic of due process.43  The due process 
34 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
35 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). 
36 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012) (setting for the requirement that States draft and implement 
policies and procedures in order to qualify for federal funds). 
37 Pub. L. No. 89-10, Section 503(a)(10), 79 Stat. 27 (1965). 
38 Pub L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC, TWENTY-
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDEA, at vi. 
(2000)  (http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2000/preface.pdf). 
39 Id. 
40 Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970). 
41 Weber, supra note 15, at 357 (describing early federal legislative efforts). 
42 Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974). 
43 In March 1973, the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate’s Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings in which a large number of printed materials 
were reviewed, including the PARC and Mills decisions, a report entitled “A Continuing 
Summary of Pending and Completed Litigation Regarding the Education of Handicapped 
                                                 
[] EVERY DAY COUNTS 7 
provisions of the 1974 Education of the Handicapped Act, while not terribly 
detailed,44 borrowed heavily from the due process procedures outlined in 
the PARC and Mills cases.45  Yet the legislative history reveals no 
discussion by Congress as to whether those due process procedures were the 
optimal means to resolve special education disputes.46   
One year later, Congress amended the Education of the Handicapped 
Act and created comprehensive special education legislation known as the 
EAHCA.47  In the EAHCA, Congress created a statutory section entitled 
“Procedural Safeguards” with very detailed due process procedures.48  Once 
again, Congress drew heavily from the due process requirements of the 
PARC and Mills decisions.49 
For example, the EAHCA required the school district to provide written 
notice to the parents50 whenever the district either proposed or refused to 
“initiate or change … the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to the child.”51  If necessary, that notice would have to be in the 
parents’ native language.52  The statute also specified that parents be 
afforded the opportunity file a complaint and an opportunity for an impartial 
due process hearing to be conducted either by the school district (labelled 
the “local educational agency” in the statute) or the state educational 
Children” edited by the Council for Exceptional Children, and a Syracuse University law 
review article entitled “Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing 
Issue” authored by Frederick Weintraub and Alan Abelson.  See Education for the 
Handicapped, 1973: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Handicapped of the S. Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong. vii, 39, 155 (1973) (hereinafter “1973 Hearing”).  
44 Pub. L. No. 93-380, §613(A), 88 Stat. 484, 582 (1974). 
45 A 1975 Senate Report stated that the 1974 Amendments “incorporated the major 
principles of the right to education cases.”  See S. Rep. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432 (1975). 
46 The Senate Conference Report that accompanies the 1974 Amendments to the 
Education of the Handicapped Act only obliquely refers to the due process procedures, 
noting that the amendments “require[] States to provide procedures for insuring that 
safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement of 
handicapped children.”  See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1026, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4206, 4257 (1974). 
47 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
48 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
49 Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped:  A Senator’s Perspective, 3 VT. 
L. REV. 71, 76 (1978) (noting that the EAHCA “codified rights already spelled out in 
earlier court decisions”).  Senator Stafford served on the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Handicapped.  See 1973 Hearing, supra note 43, at ii. 
50 A “parent” under both the EAHCA and the current IDEA is defined to mean more 
than just the child’s biological parents.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (2012). 
51 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(b)(1)(C)(ii), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
52 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(b)(1)(D), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
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agency.53   
As to the manner in which the hearing would be conducted, the statute 
provided that any party had the right (a) “to be accompanied and advised by 
counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect 
to the problems of handicapped children,”54 (b) to “present evidence,”55 (c) 
to compel the attendance of witnesses who could be subject to cross-
examination,56 (d) to a “written or electronic verbatim record”57 of the 
hearing, and (e) to receive “written findings of fact and decisions.”58   
The EACHCA gave the States some discretion in designing a due 
process structure.  The statute allowed each State to determine individually 
whether the impartial due process hearing would be held at the local level or 
the state agency level.59  If the hearing was conducted at the local level, the 
State could choose to have the parties file an appeal with the state 
educational agency, a proceeding in which a state agency-appointed review 
officer would make an “independent decision” on the matter after an 
impartial review of the hearing.60 Thereafter either party could file suit in 
either state or federal court.61  Alternatively, the State could choose not to 
require a state-level administrative appeal before either party could file suit 
in state or federal court. 
These two alternative structures are known as “one-tier” and “two-tier” 
structures.62  In a two-tier system, the impartial due process hearing is 
conducted at the local level, and the appeal of a hearing officer’s decision is 
filed with the state educational agency before a party can file suit in court.63  
In a one-tier system, following a hearing officer’s decision, a party may file 
suit directly in federal or state court.64   
This ability to select either a one-tier or a two-tier system still exists in 
IDEA today.65  However, in the last twenty years, the states increasingly 
have adopted a one-tier system.66  Currently 42 states and the District of 
53 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(b)(1)(E), 89 Stat. 773 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-142, 
§615(b)(2), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
54 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(1), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
55 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(2), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
56 Id. 
57 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(3), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
58 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(4), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
59 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(c), 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
60 Id. 
61 Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(e)(2), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).    
62 Perry A. Zirkel, et. al., Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A State-by-State 
Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 4 (2010). 
63 See e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(14) (West 2014). 
64 See e.g., 1 COLO. CODE REGS.  § 301-8:2220-R-6.02 (West 2014). 
65 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2012); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2012). 
66 Zirkel,, supra note 62, at 4. 
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Columbia have a one-tier system.67 
The due process structure that was first enacted in the EAHCA and is 
still in effect today depends almost entirely upon private enforcement of 
children’s rights by their parents.68  In almost every instance, a child’s 
parent(s) are responsible to advocate for the child at the administrative level 
and, if necessary, in state or federal court.69   
 
C.  The 1990 and 1997 Amendments to IDEA. 
 
In 1990, when Congress amended and re-authorized the EAHCA, it 
re-named the statute the Individual with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).70  The IDEA was again reauthorized and amended in both 1997 
and 2004.71  
Before the 1997 amendments, IDEA did not provide for any form of 
ADR, although mediation had been suggested as early as 1976, when the 
Commissioner of Education issued the implementing regulations for the 
EAHCA.72  In addition, the 1990 Amendments had authorized the Secretary 
67 Id. at 5; 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02 (West 2014) (Colorado moved 
from a two-tier structure to a one-tier structure beginning in 2011). 
68 Senate Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1138 
(1975) (the goal of the EAHCA was to “provide and reinforce procedural protections for 
parents and children.”). 
69 IDEA does provide for a “state complaint procedure” that allows any individual or 
organization to file a complaint with a state educational agency regarding an alleged 
violation of IDEA by a local educational agency.  See 34 C.F.R. §§300.151, 300.153 
(2012).  State complaints can involve allegations regarding the services provided to an 
individual child or a systematic, generalized violation of IDEA.  Such a complaint is filed 
with the state educational agency, which conducts an investigation and issues a decision.  
See Ruth Colker, Special Education Complaint Resolution: Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 371, 371-73 (2014) (describing state complaint procedures).  While the state 
complaint procedure is an inexpensive means to seek resolution of a special education 
dispute, it has significant limitations, including a one-year statute of limitations, the lack of 
any hearing or other means to assess credibility of witnesses, and limitations on the type of 
relief that can be ordered.  Id.  In addition, parents do not control the progress of the 
investigation as they do when a due process complaint is filed. 
70 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990). 
71 Individuals with Disabilities Amendment Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 
Stat. 37; Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-446, 118 Stat. 2467. 
72 In issuing regulations relating to procedural safeguards under the EAHCA, the 
Commissioner of Education included a comment, which stated as follows: 
 
Many States have pointed to the success of using mediation as an intervening 
step prior to conducting a formal due process hearing.  Although the process 
of mediation is not required by the statute or these regulations, an agency 
may wish to suggest mediation in disputes concerning the identification, 
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of Education to make grants to explore the resolution of special education 
disputes “in a timely manner through dispute mediation and other 
methods.”73 
In 1997, Congress amended IDEA to require the States to offer 
mediation to the parties in a special education dispute.74  Mediation was 
required to be voluntary.75  It could not be used to delay or deny the right to 
a due process hearing.76  The mediation was to be confidential, and nothing 
that occurred in mediation could be used as evidence in a subsequent due 
process or court proceeding.77  The mediation had to be conducted by a 
“qualified and impartial mediator trained in effective mediation 
techniques.”78  The cost of mediation was to be borne by the State.79 
In enacting these provisions, Congress stated its preference that special 
education disputes be resolved both quickly and amicably.  The Report of 
the Senate’s Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated the 
“committee’s strong preference that mediation become the norm for 
resolving disputes under IDEA.”80  Mediation was seen as an attractive 
method to resolve disputes “amicably” and with “the child’s best interests in 
mind.”81  Another goal of the mediation option was to reduce the cost 
associated with due process.82 
The 1997 Amendments strongly encouraged parents to use mediation as 
evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children, and the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to those children.  
Mediations have been conducted by members of State educational agencies 
or local educational agency personnel who were not previously involved in 
the particular case.  In many cases, mediation leads to resolution of 
difference between parents and agencies without the development of an 
adversarial relationship and with minimal emotional stress.  However, 
mediation may not be used to deny or delay a parent’s rights under [Subpart 
E of the EAHCA]. 
 
42 Fed. Reg. 42474, 42495 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
73 Pub. Law 101–476, 104 Stat 1103 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §1441). 
74 Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 26 (1997). 
81 Id. 
82 See S. Rep. No. 104-275, at 18 (1996).  At the time, 31 States had already developed 
mediation processes to resolve special education disputes. Id.  Congress also contemplated 
whether attorneys should be excluded from mediation proceedings, although Congress 
ultimately left that decision up to the States.  See H.R. Rep. No. 104-614, at 16 (1996) 
(discussion attorney presence in mediation). 
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a means to resolve disputes.  Any written notice to parents from a school 
district regarding proposed changes (or the refusal to make changes) with 
regard to special education services had to include information about the 
availability of mediation.83  If the parents declined to engage in mediation, 
either the school district or the state educational agency could establish 
procedures that would require the parents to meet with someone from a 
“community parent resource center” or similar entity who would 
“encourage the use, and explain the benefits, of the mediation process.”84   
At the time of the 1997 Amendments, Congress did hear testimony from 
those who advocated for mandatory mediation as a prerequisite to any due 
process proceedings.85 However, Congress did not go so far as to require 
mediation before a due process complaint could be filed. 
Following the 1997 Amendments, the Department of Education’s Office 
of Special Education Programs (OSEP), began to fund a technical assistance 
center focused on exploring special education dispute resolution.86  The 
Center for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Education (CADRE) 
is an invaluable resource for statistics and other information about special 
education dispute resolution.87  CADRE has sponsored or authored a 
number of reports regarding the use of ADR mechanisms to resolve special 
education disputes.88  CADRE also has collected information about various 
state dispute resolution systems and has highlighted the systems in four 
states – Wisconsin, Iowa, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania – as “exemplary” 
83  Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (later codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)). 
84 Pub. L. No. 105-17, Section 615 (e)(2)(B)(ii), 111 Stat. 37 (1997).  This provision of 
IDEA was later described as “a section … that essentially allows a school to punish a 
parent who doesn’t want to go to mediation by forcing them to talk to somebody about all 
the wonders of mediation.”  Special Education: Is IDEA Working as Congress Intended?: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 118-119 (2001) 
(remarks of Kevin McDowell, general counsel, from the Indiana Department of Education).  
That requirement was characterized as both “punitive” and “off-putting.”  Id. IDEA’s 
current provisions allow the local school district or state educational agency only to “offer” 
parents the opportunity to meet with someone who will explain the benefits of mediation.  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
85 The IDEA Improvement Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on 
Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 
105th Cong. 224 (1997), (statement of Lillian M. Brinkley, on behalf of the National 
Association of Elementary School Privileges, requesting statutory language that would 
“require mediation before court action could be initiated ….”). 
86 See 73 Fed. Reg. 44235, 44236 (July 30, 2008) (noting that OSEP has funded 
CADRE since 1998).  
87 http://www.directionservice.org/cadre. 
88 See, e.g. CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Trends in 
Dispute Resolution Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
(December 2013), available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Trends_DR_IDEA_DEC2013.pdf. 
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systems.89  In CADRE’s view, the qualities of these exemplary systems are 
“high levels of stakeholder involvement, investment in early upstream 
dispute resolution processes, use of technical and content expertise, active 
participation in the CADRE Dispute Resolution Community of Practice, 
engagement in continuous quality improvement practices and thorough 
documentation of systems.”90  CADRE’s website provides detailed 
information about these systems.91 
 
D.  The Current Due Process Provisions of IDEA. 
 
Congress’s last amendments of IDEA took place in 2004.  At that time, 
Congress found that parents and school districts needed “expanded 
opportunities to resolve their disagreements in positive and constructive 
ways.”92  To accomplish this goal, Congress added or expanded several 
ADR mechanisms.   
IDEA now requires the parties to attend a “resolution session” that must 
take place within 15 days after a due process complaint is filed, unless both 
parties agree to waive the session or to go to mediation.93  The legislative 
history indicates Congress’s intent that one of the main goals of the 
resolution session is to “improve communication between parents and 
school officials” when there is a dispute about services for a child with a 
disability.94   
Attendance at the resolution session is mandatory unless the session is 
waived.95    Attorneys may not be present for either side unless the parent is 
represented by an attorney; in other words, the school district’s attorney 
cannot attend unless the parent also has legal representation.96  Resolution 
sessions are not confidential and no impartial mediator or facilitator must be 
present.97  If the parties reach an agreement during a resolution session, the 
89 CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Exemplar State 
Profiles, (last visited Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/exemplarprofiles.cfm. 
90 Id. 
91 CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Four Exemplary 
Dispute Resolution Systems in Special Education (June 2010), available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Combined%20State%20Profiles.pdf.  
92 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8) (2012).   
93 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(b) (2012); see also Mark C. Weber, “Settling Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act Cases:  Making Up is Hard to Do.” 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
641, 647-51 (2010) (describing the resolution session requirements). 
94 See H.R. Rep. 108-77 at 114 (2003). 
95 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2012). 
96 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(III) (2012). 
97 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); Andrea Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes 
within the Reauthorized Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) 
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parties “shall execute a legally binding agreement,”98 but either party can 
void the agreement within three business days after it has been signed.99   
In addition to the resolution session, the 2004 Amendments made 
mediation an option that the parties could use even before a due process 
complaint was filed.100  Both the resolution session and mediation extend 
the timeline for any administrative hearing to take place, thus delaying an 
adjudicated resolution of the dispute.101 
The 2004 Amendments were quite modest in terms of altering the 
structure of due process.  Indeed, the amendments were exceedingly modest 
when one considers the variety of proposals put forth by legislators, 
scholars and experts in the field in the early 2000s. 
Beginning in 2001, both the executive and the legislative branches 
undertook extensive reviews of special education due process.  In October 
2001, President George W. Bush created a Presidential Commission on 
Excellence in Special Education, which was assigned to review special 
education practices nationwide.102 In July 2002, the Commission published 
a report entitled “A New Era:  Revitalizing Special Education for Children 
and their Families.”103  On the topic of dispute resolution, the Commission 
described numerous complaints from parents, teachers and school 
administrators about an “excessive focus on due process hearings and 
litigation over special education disputes.”104  The Commission concluded 
that IDEA dispute resolution warranted “serious reform.”105   
One of the Commission’s recommendations was to add voluntary 
binding arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.106 While the 
Commission’s report did not provide details regarding arbitration, it did 
quote the testimony of Professor S. James Rosenfeld, who testified that 
voluntary binding arbitration could be a “fair, impartial and fast” resolution 
of a special education dispute.107 In 2012, Professor Rosenfeld published an 
article in which he set forth some specific proposal for voluntary, binding 
arbitration, and that proposal is discussed in more detail below.108   
of 2004:  Where Do Mediation Principles Fit In?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 73 (2007). 
98 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). 
99 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iv) (2012). 
100 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2012). 
101 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §300.510(c)(3) (2012). 
102 Executive Order 13227, 66 Fed. Reg. 51287 (Oct. 2, 2001). 
103  “A New Era:  Revitalizing Special Education for Children and their Families,.” 
(hereinafter “A New Era”), available at 
http://www.nectac.org/~pdfs/calls/2010/earlypartc/revitalizing_special_education.pdf. 
104 A New Era, supra note 103, at 40. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 40-41. 
107 Id. at 41.   
108 See Part II.C.2., infra. 
                                                                                                                            
14 EVERY DAY COUNTS [] 
The Commission also recommended the use of early dispute resolution 
processes such as “expert IEP facilitation,”109 regarding that proposal.  In 
the early 2000s, IEP facilitation was a relatively new dispute resolution 
process, and programs for IEP facilitation are discussed in more detail 
below.110  Both voluntary, binding arbitration and IEP facilitation were 
discussed in hearings before Congressional committees charged with 
amending IDEA.111   
In March 2003, a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives 
that would have amended the due process provisions in several substantive 
ways.112  First, H.R. 1350 would have required the States to design a 
procedure for the parties to voluntarily agree to arbitrate their dispute before 
a single “arbitrator.”113  Arbitration would have been an available dispute 
resolution option after a due process complaint had been filed.  The decision 
of the arbitrator would have been a final resolution of the dispute “in lieu of 
a due process hearing” with no opportunity for further review or appeal.114  
H.R. 1350 also mentioned the use of “individualized educational program 
facilitators,”115 although no details were given. 
Second, H.R. 1350 would have amended IDEA to eliminate the two-tier 
due process structure.116  Specifically, H.R. 1350 provided that the party 
who filed a due process complaint would have the opportunity “for an 
impartial due process hearing, which [would] be conducted by the State 
educational agency” only, with a right to appeal to state or federal court 
after the SEA decision.117 
109 A New Era, supra note 103, at 40. 
110 See Part II.C.1, infra. 
111 IDEA: What’s Good for Kids? What Works for Schools?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 65 (2002) (referring to 
“informal problem resolution” and “binding arbitration” as means to resolve disputes): 
IDEA: Focusing on Improvising Results for Children with Disabilities: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Education Reform of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 108th 
Cong. 23 (2003) (discussing required mediation and binding arbitration);  The President’s 
Commission on Excellence in Special Education: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 23, 34 (2002) (discussing voluntary binding 
arbitration). 
112 See H.R. 1350, 108th Cong.,2nd Sess. (2003), (introduced in the House),   See also 
H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 113-14 (2003); Statements of John Boehner, 149 Cong. Rec. 
H3458-01, (Apr. 30, 2003) (discussing voluntary binding arbitration as a means to resolve 
special education disputes). 
113  H.R. 1350 §205(e). 
114 Id.  The bill specified that arbitration decision would not be final in the event of 
fraud or misconduct. Id. 
115 Id. at §672(a)(4). 
116 Id. at §205(f) (proposing to amend 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(1)(A)). 
117 Id. at §205(f) and 205(g); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-779 at 217 (2004) (noting 
that the House Bill “does not provide for a State-level appeal system, so eliminates the 
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Also in March 2003, Senator Rick Santorum introduced a bill entitled 
the “Teacher Paperwork Reduction Act,” which would have required, 
among other things, mandatory mediation of special education disputes 
under IDEA.118  Senate Bill 626 set forth certain proposed findings of 
Congress, including the finding that, among the causes of “burdensome 
paperwork”119 for special education teachers was the “litigation and the 
threat of litigation.”120  Another proposed finding was that mediation of 
special education disputes resolved disputes more quickly, cost less, and 
generally led to satisfactory results.121  The bill proposed to amend IDEA to 
make mediation a mandatory process in any special education dispute.122 
In the end, the 2004 Amendments did not include voluntary binding 
arbitration, IEP facilitation, or mandatory mediation.  The Amendments 
also did not eliminate the two-tier due process structure.  The only 
substantive changes were the addition of the resolution session123 and 
allowing mediation take place at any time.124 
 
 
II. THE DEBATE CONTINUES. 
 
A.  Current Criticisms of IDEA Due Process. 
 
Even with the addition of the resolution session and expanded 
opportunities for mediation, advocates for both families and school districts 
contend that due process still is expensive, time-consuming, and 
counterproductive to a collaborative parent-school relationship.  These three 
points of contention have given rise to a number of additional proposals to 
“reform” special education due process, as described in Part II.C. below.   
The litigation cost is a point of contention on both sides of the table.  
School administrators assert that litigating a special education dispute is so 
expensive that school districts often agree to provide services that are not 
dual-tier language.”). 
118 S. 626, 108th Cong., 1st  Sess. (2003), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/s626/BILLS-108s626is.pdf.  A bill entitled the “IDEA 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 2003” was introduced into the House of Representatives in 
January 2003, but that bill did not contain any provisions to amend the dispute resolution 
processes of IDEA.  See H.R. 464, 108th Cong., 1st  Sess. (2003). 
119 S. 626, §2(8). 
120 S. 626, §2(8)(C). 
121 S. 626, §2(9). 
122 S. 626, §5. 
123 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B). 
124 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
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required by IDEA125  These advocates also contend that, when school 
districts provide unnecessary services to one child to avoid litigation costs, 
other children with disabilities suffer.  The argument is that, due to limited 
school budgets, the children who receive unnecessary services as a result of 
school district capitulation take those services away from other children in 
need.126   
While this argument has a certain facial appeal, some scholars challenge 
the twin assumptions underlying this argument, specifically that parents 
who file a due process complaint always want expensive services, and that 
special education funding is a “fixed pot of educational goods”127 such that 
a service provided to one child means less service for another child.128  
Indeed, there are many inexpensive disputes that could give rise to a special 
education dispute, including a parent’s desire to have the child educated in a 
less restrictive, less expensive environment129 or a dispute about whether a 
child’s violation of the school code of conduct was a manifestation of the 
child’s disability.130   
Moreover, rather than dealing with a limited, inflexible budget, school 
districts have many ways of managing the costs of special education 
services, including litigation costs.  School districts have the ability to 
purchase insurance for special education litigation at attractive rates.131  
School districts also can access state funding for special education services 
from state education agencies, many of whom have established state risk 
125 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 2. 
126 Id. at 8. 
127 Weber, supra note 14, at 505. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 IDEA requires that, if necessary, a school district bear the cost of a child’s 
placement in a private school or residential facility. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(B) (2012).  
Some critics assume parents who file due process are seeking these expensive placements.  
See, e.g., Pudelski, supra note 9, at 8, n.19.  In evaluating this argument, one should 
consider that, as of 2010, just 3.4% of the nation’s 6.4 million children receiving special 
education services were placed in the “expensive” settings such as a separate school for 
children with disabilities or a residential facility.  See Thomas D. Snyder, et. al., U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2014-015, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 89 tbl. 48 
(2013), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014015.pdf [hereinafter DIGEST OF 
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012] (number of children with disabilities receiving services 
under IDEA); DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, at 91 tbl. 50 (placement of children 
receiving services under IDEA).  In contrast, in 2010, nearly 81% of those 6.4 million 
children were placed in a general education classroom for 40-100% of their school day.  Id. 
(second table).  Over 60% of the children were in the general education classroom between 
80-100% of the school day.  Id. 
131 Debra Chopp, “School Districts and Families under the IDEA: Collaborative in 
Theory, Adversarial in Fact,” 32 NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 454-57 (2012). 
                                                 
[] EVERY DAY COUNTS 17 
pools.132  In addition, most state funding mechanisms provide increased 
funding to districts based on a calculation of the level of service being 
provided to all children with disabilities in the district.133 
On the other side of the table, advocates for families contend that due 
process is too expensive for most parents because they cannot afford to pay 
the fees of attorneys and expert witnesses who are needed to litigate a 
special education dispute.134  Indeed, it is a focus of legislative action by 
parent-child advocacy groups that IDEA be amended to ease the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees and to allow the recovery of expert witness fees.135 
On this topic of cost, some scholars raise the very real concern that the 
current structure disproportionately favors wealthier parents whose income 
allows them to advocate for their child in a due process proceeding, when 
lower income parents are unable to bear the litigation costs and therefore 
cannot advocate for their children similarly.136  This inequality of access to 
due process becomes an even more acute problem when one considers that, 
statistically, children with disabilities are more likely to be a member of a 
lower-income family137 
The other main criticism of the current due process system is that, as a 
form of litigation, it is anti-collaborative and poisons the school-parent 
relationship, ultimately to the detriment of the child.138  Unlike many other 
disputes, a special education dispute involves two parties who need to 
maintain a working relationship that will last as long as the child resides in 
the school district.139  In addition, each of the parties has a genuine interest 
in producing a good educational outcome for the child even as they might 
differ about the means to accomplish that goal.  Given this dynamic, some 
argue that special education dispute resolution should take a form that is as 
removed from an adversarial, litigation process as possible.140 
These criticisms of due process have led to widely-varying proposals for 
change.  There are essentially five main proposals, each of which is 
described below.  Before describing these proposals, however, it is helpful 
to briefly consider issues that commonly give rise to a special education 
132 Weber, supra note 14, at 506. 
133 Id. 
134 See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 10, at 112-13. 
135 COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, PUBLIC POLICY, Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004, http://www.copaa.org/?page=IDEA (2012) 
(advocating for statutory amendments to provide for the payment of expert witness fees 
and attorneys’ fees in special education disputes). 
136 See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1430-33; Hyman, supra note 10. 
137 Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1432. 
138 Moses, supra note 3, at 4. 
139 Id. 
140 Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 551. 
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dispute. 
 
B.  Common Issues in Special Education Disputes. 
 
The first “decision point” in the process of receiving special education 
services is a determination by the school district that a child meets IDEA’s 
definition of a “child with a disability.”141  IDEA defines a child with a 
disability as a child who fits into at least one of thirteen identified disability 
categories.142  In addition, the child’s disability must “adversely affect” the 
child’s educational performance such that the child needs special education 
services in order to access the educational curriculum.143  Thus, eligibility is 
one topic that could be the subject of a dispute. 
Once a child is deemed eligible for special education, the school district, 
together with the child’s parents, is required to prepare an individualized 
educational program (IEP) for the child.  The IEP document has been 
described as the “cornerstone” of the child’s right to an appropriate 
education.144  The IEP is a written document that contains very detailed 
provisions about the child’s levels of educational performance, statements 
of the projected goals and objectives for the child’s progress in the coming 
year, the means by which the child’s progress will be measured and 
reported to the parents, the level and type of services to be provided, and the 
educational setting, among other details.145  Given the IEP’s importance, it 
is not surprising that many disputes involve disagreements about the 
contents of a child’s IEP. 
 The child’s educational placement – the setting or classroom where the 
child will receive services – also can be the subject of a dispute.  IDEA 
provides that a child with a disability should receive services in the least 
restrictive environment146 that will allow the child to learn.  Special 
education is to be provided along a “continuum of alternative 
placements”147 that can range from placement in the general education 
classroom to placement in a private school or residential facility at public 
141 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2012). 
142 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012). 
143 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2007) (defining a “child with a disability”). 
144 See, e.g., White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 378 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (“[t]he cornerstone of the IDEA is the IEP”); Tenn. Dep't of Mental Health & 
Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th Cir. 1996), citing Honig v. Doe, 
484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (“[t]he development and implementation of the IEP are the 
cornerstones of the Act”).  
145 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)-(4) (2012); 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V)-(VI) (2012). 
146 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
147 34 C.F.R. 300.115 (2006). 
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expense.148  Parents often have very strong views about whether their child 
should or should not be mainstreamed or included in the general education 
environment.149   For this reason, appropriate placement frequently is a 
disputed matter. 
There are a myriad of other remaining issues that could be the subject of 
a dispute.150  A child with a disability who violates the school code of 
conduct may be subject to discipline, but only if the school determines that 
the child’s conduct was not a manifestation of the child’s disability.151  A 
parent may file due process to contest a disciplinary matter, arguing that the 
child’s conduct was a manifestation of the child’s disability.  A parent also 
may file due process on the ground that the district failed to provide the 
services that had been agreed upon in the child’s IEP.152  A parent might 
file due process relating to the child’s entitlement to “extended school year” 
(ESY), or summer, services.153 
All of these varied potential areas for dispute are important to keep in 
mind when evaluating the proposals to modify the due process structure.   
 
C.  Proposals to Reform Due Process. 
 
1. IEP Facilitation. 
 
148 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(B) (2012) (addressing placement of children in private 
schools by public agencies). 
149 Ruth A. Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption:  Thirty Years Later, 154 
U. PENN. L. REV. 789, 811-14 (2006) (describing circumstances where parents and school 
districts are likely to disagree about integration and placement).   
150 Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer Final 
Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J. L. & EDUC. 501 (2013); see also Perry 
A. Zirkel & Cathy A. Skidmore, National Trends in Frequency and Outcome of Hearing 
and Review Officer Decisions under the IDEA: An Empirical Analysis, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 525, 543 (2014) (identifying different categories of issues to be resolved by 
due process hearing officers). 
151 See Cope-Kasten, supra note 150, at Appendix A (reporting the results of a review 
of 210 due process hearings held in Wisconsin and Minnesota from 2000-2011, noting that 
38% involved a dispute about evaluation, 6% involved a dispute about disciplinary issues, 
and 6% involved a dispute about teacher qualifications). 
152 See, e.g., Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2008 WL 191176 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 22, 
2008) (awarding compensatory education because the school district had failed to 
implement the IEP goals and objectives).  Compensatory education has been described as 
the “poor man’s tuition reimbursement” because it is a form of relief that parents can 
request when the school district failed to provide the child with a FAPE either by 
implementing an inadequate IEP or by failing to provide the services that were agreed-
upon in the IEP.  See Terry Jean Seligman and Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education 
for IDEA Violations: The Silly Putty of Remedies, 45 URB. LAW. 281, 295 (2013). 
153 34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2007). 
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In an effort to limit disputes that can arise during the IEP process, 
approximately twenty-nine states have initiated programs known generally 
as IEP facilitation.154  IEP facilitation is not required by IDEA.  Rather, it is 
a voluntary process that the parties may use to resolve disputes about the 
contents of a child’s IEP.   
The dynamics of the IEP process are such that it is a common point at 
which disputes arise.155  It is the school district’s obligation to draft the 
IEP,156 and district employees obviously have a great deal of knowledge 
and experience since they draft IEPs for all eligible children in the district. 
In contrast, many parents are not experts in writing IEPs.157  Because it is 
the district’s obligation to draft the IEP and the parent’s obligation 
essentially to “read and approve,”158 a power imbalance can result.159  The 
district’s employees naturally have an upper hand in asserting positions in 
an IEP meeting and, in fact, some educators may resent parent input 
because of the educators’ belief that they are the experts in the field.160   
In addition, given IDEA’s requirements for attendance at IEP meetings, 
when the meeting is held, the child’s parent(s) will be in a room with 
several district employees.161  Parents can begin to feel outnumbered, with 
the result that they sometimes are reluctant to express their opinions 
freely.162  Parents also often perceive that their opinions are discounted.  
Parents report that district employees often make patronizing comments 
about parents’ affection for their child, with the undertone that the parent’s 
opinions stem from emotion rather than reasoned judgment about 
appropriate educational services for the child.163 
154 CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Process and 
Practice Information, (last visited  Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/processdefs14.cfm?thisid=12; Blau, supra note 
97, at 78-9. 
155 Chopp, supra note 131, at 432-38. 
156 20 U.S.C. 1412 (a)(4) (2012). 
157 Chopp, supra note 131, at 434. 
158 Id. 
159 Blau, supra note 97, at 79. 
160 Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough:  External Advocacy in Special 
Education,” 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1831 (2008); see also Nancy Welsh, Stepping Back 
Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants about 
Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 615-17 
(2004).  For a review of the literature detailing studies of parents’ perceptions of the IEP 
process, see CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Parents’ 
Experiences with the IEP Process: Considerations for Improving Practice (April 2010) 
(http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Parent-IEP%20Process.pdf). 
161 20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) (describing the various school personnel who are 
part of a child’s IEP team). 
162 Chopp, supra note 131, at 432. 
163 Id. at 433 (“parents are seen by school districts as lacking emotional distance....”). 
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Given these dynamics and the importance of the IEP in ensuring that the 
child receives appropriate services, the idea developed that the presence of a 
neutral third-party in an IEP meeting could help level the playing field 
between parents and school personnel.164  Facilitated IEP meetings occur 
when a neutral third-party assists in the organization and discussion of an 
IEP meeting, with the goal of ensuring that the parties remained focused on 
future action, specifically the process of writing a document that will serve 
the best interests of the child.165  The parties can agree to use IEP 
facilitation at any point during the process of drafting a child’s IEP and, 
ideally, IEP facilitation will be used as soon as an “acrimonious climate” 
begins to develop.166    
The role of the IEP facilitator has been described as “focus[ing] on the 
dynamics of the meeting”167 to ensure that all attendees have an opportunity 
to fully express their views, that attendees listen respectfully to others, and 
that the attendees direct their efforts to finding common ground as a means 
to resolve the matter.168  The facilitator is to “establish ground rules for the 
meeting, aid participants in developing clarifying questions which often 
lean to mutual solutions and require members of the team to adhere to 
timelines for completion of the meeting.”169 The IEP facilitator is not 
present to offer opinions about the strengths or weaknesses of a particular 
party’s position or to otherwise negotiate the terms of the IEP document.  
The use of IEP facilitation has expanded rapidly in the last ten years.  In 
2005, IEP facilitation programs existed in just eight states.170  Today 
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have IEP facilitation 
programs.171   
164 Blau, supra note 97, at 78-79 (describing IEP facilitation generally). 
165 See Tracy C. Mueller, “IEP Facilitation:  A Promising Approach to Resolving 
Conflicts Between Parents and Families,” 41 TEACHING Exceptional Children 61 (Jan/Feb. 
2009); It has been reported that some school district personnel are uncomfortable with IEP 
facilitation because they perceive themselves as more experienced in writing IEP and 
question the facilitator’s knowledge or expertise in the area.  Kelly Henderson, “Optional 
IDEA Alternative Dispute Resolution” 13 (2008)  (available at 
http://www.nasdse.org/publications-t577/optional-idea-alternative-dispute-resolution.aspx). 
166 Edward Feinberg, et. al., “Beyond Mediation:  Strategies for Appropriate Early 
Dispute Resolution in Special Education,” at 23 (available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Beyond%20Mediation.pdf. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Mueller, supra note 11, at 64, citing Feinberg, supra note 166. 
170 Moses, supra note 3, at 8. 
171 Id.; see also CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., 
Process and Practice Information, (last visited  Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/processdefs14.cfm?thisid=12 (information on 
CADRE’s website about IEP facilitation programs in various states).  Those states are 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
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CADRE has been an early and strong supporter of IEP Facilitation.172  
CADRE’s website contains a great deal of information about IEP 
facilitation, including results of surveys completed by parties who had 
participated in IEP facilitation.173 These surveys indicate a high level of 
satisfaction with the process.174 
 
2. Public Enforcement of IDEA. 
 
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.   
While there is no statewide program, some local school districts within Kansas offer 
IEP facilitation. See, e.g., OLATHE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SPECIAL SERVICES, OLATHE SPECIAL 
SERVICES SITE COUNCIL 2013-2014 (Mar. 2013), 
http://schools.olatheschools.com/buildings/north/files/2012/06/Special-Service-
English.pdf.  
In addition, several other states have either had IEP facilitation programs in the past or 
are contemplating an IEP facilitation program.  Indiana had an IEP facilitation project, but 
funding has ended.  CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Co-
Facilitation IEP Meeting Project  - Indiana (last visited Jan. 24, 2015), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/practicesA.cfm?id=61.  In June 2014, the New 
York State Education Department posted a request for applications to participate in an IEP 
Facilitation pilot program scheduled to begin in 2015. N.Y.  STATE EDUC. DEP’T, SPECIAL 
EDUC., Request for Applications – Individualized Education Program (IEP) Facilitators, 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/applications/IEPfacilitatorrequest.htm (last updated 
June 9, 2014). In 2012, the Georgia State Advisory Panel for Special Education apparently 
explored the idea of having facilitated IEP meetings and tentatively planned to implement a 
full program by 2015.  GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., Minutes Summary: State Advisory Panel 
Meeting (April 26-27, 2012).  Florida officials apparently also have discussed IEP 
facilitation.  See FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., Meeting Report: State Advisory Committee for the 
Education of Exceptional Students (Aug. 5-6, 2013) ( 
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7571/urlt/0086224-aug2013.pdf).  Missouri is 
considering IEP facilitation. MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., 
Minutes: Special Education Advisory Panel Meeting (Mar. 7, 2014),  
http://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/se-seap-special-education-advisory-panel-minutes3-
14.pdf. 
172 See Moses, supra note 3, at 6; Feinberg, supra note 166, at 23; CTR. FOR 
APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Facilitated IEP Meetings: An 
Emerging Practice (published November 2004) (available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CADRE%20Engl
ish.pdf). 
173CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Post IEP 
Facilitation Facilitator Survey Results 2007-2008, (November 2008),  
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/artifacts/WI-
20%20Post%20IEP%20Facilitators%20Survey%20NOV08.pdf.  
174 See, e.g., http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/NC-08-
09FacilitationEndYearReport.pdf (providing results of a survey conducted in Wisconsin 
                                                                                                                            
[] EVERY DAY COUNTS 23 
As stated above, some scholars criticize the due process structure as a 
system that, due to its reliance on parents as the child’s advocate, 
disproportionately favors wealthier and more educated families who have 
the means to pursue due process.175  To counteract this inequality, these 
scholars recommend several steps to enhance public enforcement of IDEA’s 
requirements.176  One step is a proposal to increase the government’s 
collection and publication of data relating to special education, with the 
belief that additional public information may reduce “information 
asymmetries”177 that are thought to benefit wealthier families in the 
“informational game.”178  Examples of data that the government might 
collect and publish would be more detailed data regarding the special 
education classification and placement of children disaggregated by income 
or socioeconomic status.179   
A more ambitious suggestion is to have the government create a 
database of IEPs that would be cross-referenced with the child’s (i.e. 
family’s) income.180  One suggested benefit of such a database is that it 
would allow parents without financial resources to obtain information about 
the type of services received by children of wealthier families.181  Another 
suggested benefit of this database is that districts might, with the benefit of 
the data, be “nudged” to avoid making class-based differences in their 
treatment of children in the district.182 The recognized impediments to the 
creation of such a database are the cost involved and the risk that a child’s 
personally identifiable information might be included in the data.183  
175 Pasachoff, supra note 12; Hyman, supra note 10; Alex Hurder, Left Behind with No 
“IDEA”: Children with Disabilities Without Means, 34 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 283 (2014).  
Indeed, soon after the passage of EAHCA, there were some concerns expressed that the 
system of private enforcement might be insufficient. Note, Enforcing the Right to an 
“Appropriate” Education: the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 
Harvard L. Rev. 1103 (1979). 
176 Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1461-88; Hyman, supra note 10, at 150-55 & 159-62.  
These scholars also propose a number of other legislative changes, including provisions 
that ease the recovery of attorneys’ fees by parents, explicit authorization to recover expert 
witness fees, requiring the school district to bear the burden of proof to demonstrate 
compliance with IDEA’s requirements, amending the statutory language regarding 
procedural inadequacies as a basis for prevailing in a due process matter, among other 
changes. Hyman, supra note 10, at 146-50 (discussing attorneys’ fees and expert witness 
fees, burden of proof); Hurder, supra note 175, at 306-09 (discussing attorneys’ fees and 
expert witness fees, relief for procedural violations) 
177 Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1437-40. 
178 Id. at 1438. 
179 Id. at 1145-46. 
180 Id. at 1467-68. 
181 Id. at 1468. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1470-72. 
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Another proposal is to have state educational agencies engage in 
random audits or investigations of districts to assess the quality of IEPs for 
low-income children.184  The state investigators could either assess the 
quality of IEPs in isolation, “without making any comparisons to other 
IEPs,”185 or compare the IEPs of “low-income and high-income students in 
the same district” to determine disparities in treatment and the overall 
quality of IEPs written for low-income students.  If the state found 
disparities in services or placement that were not “educationally 
justified,”186 then the state could order that the IEPs for those students be re-
written and that the district make “systemic changes”187 to reduce the 
possibility that disparities would continue to exist. 
A third proposal is to have federal agencies be more aggressive in 
investigating and, when appropriate, enforcing IDEA’s requirements in 
litigation.188 
A fourth proposal is for Congress to provide funds to states that would 
take steps to ensure that “poor children are provided with services as good 
as those provided to wealthier children.”189  This proposal seeks to offer 
financial incentives to states that voluntarily examine the relationship 
between family wealth and special education services and, when 
inequalities are found, institute reforms to any disparities that are 
attributable to family income.190 
A final proposal in the realm of “public enforcement” is to increase the 
availability of pro bono attorneys, law school clinics, and community 
advocates to help low-income families understand and access the existing 
due process system.191  This includes one proposal that is modeled after a 
public defender system, in which each child is assigned a special advocate – 
not necessarily an attorney – as soon as the child is identified as a child who 
might be in need of special education services.192 
 
3. Voluntary, Binding Arbitration. 
 
Since the 2004 Amendments to IDEA, discussion of the use of 
184 Id. at 1473-74. 
185 Id. at 1473. 
186 Id. at 1475. 
187 Id. 
188 Hyman, supra note 10, at 159-60. 
189 Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1486. 
190 Id. at 1486-87. 
191 Ruth A. Colker, DISABLED EDUCATION 244-45 (2013); Hurder, supra note 175, at 
306-07; Hyman, supra note 10, at 158-59. 
192 Erin Phillips, “When Parents Aren’t Enough:  External Advocacy in Special 
Education,” 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1847-48 (2008). 
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voluntary, binding arbitration has continued.193  Some scholars contend that 
Congress “wisely eschewed”194 the arbitration model because of the lack of 
good evidence that arbitration would be less costly or faster than an 
administrative hearing.195 Others argue that, given the costs and delay 
associated with “over-legalization”196 of due process hearings, special 
education disputes should be resolved through an arbitration process using 
“a single–session hearing without judicial appeal,”197 except in limited 
circumstances involving “major new legal issues.”198 
 In 2012, Professor S. James Rosenfeld published an article on the 
topic.199  Professor Rosenfeld contends that arbitration would improve 
IDEA’s due process structure by providing both “a more balanced ‘access 
to justice’ and swift and final decisions.”200  Among the stated advantages 
of voluntary binding arbitration would be “eliminating the need for 
attorneys”201 in order to decrease the “adversarial atmosphere”202 of due 
process.  Another potential benefit would be “a much shorter timeline for 
decision and implementation.”203  A third benefit is described as an 
increased “focus … on the student’s educational program” as a result of a 
less-adversarial proceeding.204  Finally, a fourth identified benefit is that the 
arbitration panel, if composed as described below, would have “greater 
expertise” in both the legal and teaching/educational issues than the 
mediators or due process hearing officers who currently hear special 
education matters.205 
Professor Rosenfeld describes his proposal as a “snapshot”206 of a 
proposed arbitration system rather than a specific proposal which, he states, 
would be further developed with the input of a variety of stakeholders in the 
process.207  With that caveat, Professor Rosenfeld proposes that arbitration 
193 See Rosenfeld, supra note 11. 
194 Mark C. Weber, “Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Improvement 
Act,” 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 52 (2006) 
195 Id.  
196 Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195 ED. LAW. REP. 
35, 38 (2005). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Rosenfeld, supra note 11. 
200 Id. at 545. 
201 Id. at 551. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 547. 
207 Id. at 551 (“None of this is meant to be exhaustive; to the contrary, it is set forth in 
the hope and expectation that others can and will identify oversights and made additional 
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would involve a three-person panel consisting of an expert in the child’s 
primary disability, an expert in the field of special education (administration 
or provision of services), and an attorney familiar with special education 
laws.208  The parties may opt for binding arbitration only after giving “fully 
informed and completely voluntary”209 consent, which would have to 
include an explicit understanding that the parties are foregoing any right to 
appeal the panel’s decision.   
Professor Rosenfeld also proposes that no attorneys can be present in 
the proceeding unless the parent also either has an attorney or consents to 
the presence of the school district’s attorney.210  The panel would have 
“complete discretion”211 to determine both the rules under which the 
proceeding would be conducted and “the nature and scope of the evidence 
(witnesses or documents) it will seek or hear.”212  Indeed, it would be the 
responsibility of the panel to “assume a controlling role in the process,” 
including calling expert witnesses, questioning other witnesses, seeking 
evaluations of the child, or reformulating the issues before the panel.213  The 
record of the proceeding would be confidential and “substantive challenges 
to the decision” would be heard only by the panel.214 
To accomplish the goal of providing a quick resolution of the dispute, 
Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the panel be required to issue its decision 
within “thirty school days”215 from the assignment of the matter to the 
arbitration panel unless, due to unusual circumstances, the parties agree to 
an extension of time at the beginning of the proceedings.216  Professor 
Rosenfeld further proposes that the decision should be written as a “quasi-
IEP” with a description of goals, programs, and services to be provided.217  
To ensure that the parties comply with the terms of the arbitration decision, 
Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the state educational agency be given 
authority to enforce the terms of the decision, and that the SEA be required 
suggestions.”). 
208 Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 561-563 
209 Id. at 552. 
210 Id. at 554.    
211 Id. 
212 Id.  This part of the proposal implies that parents would lose rights currently 
available under IDEA, including the rights to “present evidence and confront, cross-
examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”  20 U.S.C. §1415(h)(2) (2012). 
213 Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 560-61. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 557.  This timeline thus is essentially the same as the forty-five day period for 
resolving a due process matter that had been required by IDEA before Congress added the 
thirty-day resolution session period in 2004.  See note 2, supra.  Thirty school days equals 
forty-two calendar days.  (five school days in a week times six weeks).   
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 557. 
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to “assure compliance” within fifteen days after receiving a complaint, 
presumably filed by the parent, that the decision is not being implemented 
properly.218 
Professor Rosenfeld does not propose that arbitration replace the current 
due process structure, only that it be added to IDEA as another dispute 
resolution system that the parties can choose to access.219 
 
4. A Radical Overhaul of Special Education Due Process. 
 
In July 2013, the American Association of School Administrators 
(AASA) published a report proposing “critical changes”220 to special 
education due process.221  The AASA contends that, for a number of 
reasons, the current due process system is not working well.  In addition to 
the criticisms noted above, specifically that due process costs too much,222 
unfairly disadvantages lower-income families, and “breeds hostility”223 
between parents and school officials, the AASA sets forth several additional 
reasons why the current due process structure is either obsolete or 
ineffective. 
The AASA first contends that the current due process structure has 
become obsolete due to changes in federal education legislation, particularly 
the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act224 and the 2004 amendments to IDEA.  
AASA cites the data reporting requirements of NCLB and IDEA as 
“wield[ing] significant pressure on districts”225 such that due process “no 
218 Id. at 558. 
219 Id. at 566. 
220 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 2. 
221 Pudelski, supra note 9. 
222 The AASA cites a survey it conducted of 200 school superintendents across the 
country, in which the survey respondents indicated that school districts may budget 
between $12,000 and $50,000 per year to address potential costs associated with due 
process or litigation. Id. at 13.  National data on annual school budgets indicates that, on 
average, $50,000 is a modest sum for most school districts in the nation. In the 2009-2010 
school year, there were 13,625 “regular” school districts in the United States with total 
revenues of $597 billion.  DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 146 tbl. 100 (number 
of public elementary and secondary education agencies); Id. at 315 tbl. 203 (revenue for 
public elementary and secondary schools).  Thus, the average school budget was $43.8 
million dollars.  Using that figure, $50,000 is 0.00114% of the average school budget.  
$12,000 is 0.00027% of the average school budget. 
The AASA did acknowledge that districts can purchase insurance to cover the 
litigation costs of special education due process.  Id. at 14 (citing annual premiums between 
$2,500 and $10,000). 
223 Id. at 9. 
224 Pub. Law. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).  
225 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 7. 
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longer serves as a powerful compliance lever.”226  
The AASA also implies that the current structure is unnecessary 
because children with disabilities no longer need robust due process 
protections they might have needed in the past, stating that “[t]he inclusion 
of people with disabilities in all walks of life is now a given.”227  This 
proposition is belied by current events demonstrating that children with 
disabilities are often the subject of bullying and hatred,228 sometimes even 
at the hands of school employees.229   
Another cited reason for overhauling the current structure is the lack of 
data demonstrating that success in a due process hearing leads to a better 
educational outcome for the student.230  This is an argument in the negative; 
the lack of any data, positive or negative, leads the AASA to conclude that 
the system does not work.231    
In addition, reciting several anecdotal stories, the AASA asserts that due 
process adversely affects teacher retention in the field of special 
education.232  In fact, the retention of special education teachers is subject to 
a myriad of factors, including salary consideration, school climate, and 
226 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 9. The AASA proposal contends that district compliance 
is driven by the potential for adverse consequences under federal law, including loss of 
federal funding, “intensive state monitoring,” id., or state-level imposed mandated 
improvement activities.  Id.     
227 Id. at 16. 
228 See, e.g., Trudi Bird and Joe Kemp, Family of 13-year-old Autistic Boy Disgusted 
After Hate-Filled Letter is Slipped Under Their Door Urging Them to ‘Euthanize’ Boy for 
Being a Neighborhood ‘Nuisance’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2013, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/disgusting-father-hate-filled-letter-euthanize-
autistic-son-nuisance-article-1.1431505; Associated Press, Prosecutors Mull Charges 
Against Teen Accused in Prank ‘Ice Bucket Challenge’ on Autistic Boy, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Sept. 17, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/ice-bucket-prank-autism-
_n_5834882.html. 
229 Associated Press, Olympia Bus Driver Accused of Bullying Disabled Girl,  
KOMONEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2014, http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Olympia-
school-bus-driver-accused-of-bullying-girl-256352061.html; Koehler v. Juaniata Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 2008 WL 1787632 (M.D. Pa., April 17, 2008) (teachers placed a non-verbal autistic 
child in a thermally insulated, camouflage jumpsuit, sealed the jumpsuit with duct tape, 
raised the temperature in the room, and locked the child in the room alone; the court held 
that the parent, on behalf of the child, could pursue claims under both federal and state law 
against the school district and individual employees). 
230 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 7.  
231 Id. at 21 (criticizing the lack of any follow-up after a due process decision to 
determine whether the outcome of due process “positively or negatively affected student 
performance.”).  Professor Mark Weber notes that the data demanded by AASA would be 
very difficult to obtain, noting that “a researcher would be hard put to design a controlled 
experiment that would be consistent with ethical practices that would test that hypothesis.”  
Weber, supra note 14, at 511. 
232 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
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administrative support, among others.233  Although “paperwork” has been 
identified as one cause leading to special education teacher attrition, neither 
due process nor litigation is specifically cited as a reason why a special 
education teacher might leave the field.234 
What does the AASA propose?  The AASA describes its proposal as 
“two-pronged approach”235 designed to make it “more difficult for litigation 
to occur.”236 Indeed, the AASA acknowledges an overall goal to “creat[e] a 
‘lawyer-free system’ [in which] “costs for districts will be significantly 
reduced.”237   
The AASA proposal requires the parties to engage in IEP facilitation 
with state-provided, trained facilitator before any form of due process or 
litigation could be pursued.238  No lawyers or advocates may be present in 
the IEP facilitation meeting.239  The AASA proposal does not describe 
procedures to be used if the special education dispute did not an involve 
issue relating to a child’s IEP. 
If IEP facilitation fails to resolve the dispute, then the parties must 
engage in mediation.240  Again, no lawyers may be present and, for some 
reason, no legally binding agreement could be created.241   
If mediation fails, the AASA proposal would then require the joint 
selection of an “independent, neutral, special education consultant 
designated by the state to…advise the parties on how to devise a suitable 
compromise IEP.”242 The consultant, once notified of the request for his or 
her services, would have fifteen days to hold an initial meeting with the 
parties.243  Following that meeting, the consultant would have an additional 
twenty-one244 days to make observations, review records, and write an 
IEP.245  The parties then “would be obligated to follow the consultant-
designed IEP for a mutually agreed upon period of time”246 that is not 
233 See Bonnie S. Billingsley, Special Education Teacher Retention and Attrition: A 
Critical Analysis of the Literature, at 37 (April 2003) (available at 
http://copsse.education.ufl.edu/docs/RS-2/1/RS-2.pdf. 
234 Id. at 23. 
235 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 17. 
236 Id.   
237 Id. at 22. 
238 Id. at 18. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 19. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 4, 20. 
243 Id. at 20. 
244 The AASA proposal in one section refers to a twenty-one day period, Id. at 20, but, 
in another section, refers to a thirty-day period.  Id. at 21, n.70. 
245 Id. at 20-21. 
246 Id. at 4. 
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specified.  Again, this is a step in the process where lawyers would not be 
involved.247 
If, after all of the procedures described above – IEP Facilitation, 
voluntary mediation, implementation of a consultant-written IEP – have 
been satisfied, any party who wishes to pursue the matter further may file a 
“lawsuit in federal court.”248 Thus, the AASA proposal would “abolish[] the 
[due process] hearing system”249 entirely.250  
The AASA’s proposal has been recognized by scholars,251 advocacy 
groups252 and practitioners253 as an attempt to weaken the procedural 
protections IDEA currently grants to children and their parents.  Indeed, 
although the AASA report cited Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal for 
voluntary, binding arbitration with approval, Professor Rosenfeld himself 
has disavowed any association with the AASA proposal.254   
 
5. Defending the Current Structure. 
 
The fifth main proposal to modify the special education due process is 
actually labelled as a “defense” of due process.255  In a recent article, 
Professor Mark Weber contends that the criticisms of the system are “badly 
247 Id. at 22 (describing the consultancy system as a “lawyer-free system” that would 
“level the playing field between low-income families and districts in IDEA disputes”).  
248 Id. at 20. 
249 Id. at 21. 
250 Id. at 23 (noting that the proposal would “replac[e] the due process system”). 
251 Weber, supra note 14; See Yael Cannon, et. al., A Solution Hiding in Plain Sight: 
Special Education and Better Outcomes for Children with Social, Emotional and 
Behavioral Challenges, 41 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 403, 490 (2013).   
252 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, NEWS & PRESS: 
POLICY, AASA Document Nothing More Than A Shameful Attack on Parent and Student 
Civil Rights, http://www.copaa.org/news/121292/AASA-Document-Nothing-More-Than-
A-Shameful-Attack-on-Parent-and-Student-Civil-Rights-.html, (Apr. 4, 2013). 
253 Gregory Branch, Orange County Special Education Attorney Opposes AASA 
Proposal, THE LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY R. BRANCH L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2013), 
http://www.ocspecialedattorney.com/orange-county-special-education-attorney-opposes-
aasa-proposal/ (describing the AASA proposal as “unfairly tilting the balance of power” in 
favor of school districts, which would be represented by a “highly-trained district office 
administrator, many of whom hold doctorate degrees in education or more specifically 
special education….”); see also Mary Richard, AASA, the Emperor’s New Clothes, Special 
Education Mediations and Due Process Hearings, SPECIAL EDUC. L. IN IOWA BLOG, 
http://specialeducationlawmmr.blogspot.com/2013/04/aasa-emperors-new-clothes-
special.html. 
254 S. James Rosenfeld, Director’s Statement on AASA Report on Due Process, NAT’L 
ACAD. FOR IDEA ADMIN. JUDGES AND HEARING OFFICERS,  
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/continuing-legal-education/upcoming-programs/idea-aljho-
academy.   
255 Weber, supra note 14. 
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overblown”256 and that the system generally is cost-effective and yields 
good results for parents, particularly when compared to litigation outcomes 
in other contexts.257  He proposes that, with only “a few modest 
reforms,”258 the current structure would meet the parties’ expectations and 
fulfill IDEA’s goals. 
Professor Weber acknowledges that income inequality affect parents’ 
abilities to pursue due process, but notes that such inequality exists 
throughout our legal and economic systems.259  He argues that income 
inequality is not a reason to radically overhaul the system, noting that there 
is a “ripple effect of successful due process hearings”260 under which 
litigation funded by higher income families has some benefit to other 
children in the system by creating good law, leading to statutory 
amendments and the like.261 He also notes that due process decisions 
awarding tuition reimbursement to wealthier parents for private placements 
can lead school districts to improve or create programs within the public 
school system that benefit additional children.262 
As noted above,263 Professor Weber also takes issue with the notion that 
successful due process pursued by wealthier families leaves other children 
with fewer services.  Among the reasons he gives are that often parents may 
not be asking for more expensive services (citing the example where parents 
want a child to be educated in the least restrictive environment) and the fact 
that states often allocate more money to districts that serve students with 
greater needs.264   
Professor Weber also challenges the belief that due process structure is 
too costly for school districts.265  He cites a 2003 study by the Government 
Accounting Office, which found that the number of formal special 
education disputes was relatively low and a 2013 CADRE report indicating 
256 Id. at 495 
257 Id. at 510. 
258 Id. at 495. 
259 Id. at 503, citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculation 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
260  Id. at 505. 
261  Id. at 505-06;  
262 Id.; see also Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  171, 181 (2005) (“[O]utspoken parents may serve the interests 
of all children in the school district and, by informational spillover, of the nation. In this 
light, the distribution of resources among children with disabilities may not be a zero-sum 
game. … The advocacy work of some parents may pay dividends for everyone; it raises the 
standards of appropriate special education and augments the rights of all children.”). 
263 Part II.A., supra. 
264 Weber, supra note 14, at 505-07. 
265 Id. at 508-09. 
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that due process hearing requests and hearings have been declining.266  
Indeed, statistics contained within the AASA’s own proposal support 
Professor Weber’s opinion.  The AASA’s survey of school administrators 
indicates that the number of disputes is low.267  More than one-half (51%) 
of the school superintendents who responded to the AASA survey had not 
“been involved in special education litigation or due process in the past five 
years.”268  Ninety percent of the survey respondents had had fewer than five 
due process hearings in the last five years.269 
Professor Weber proposes that due process could be improved with 
“modest procedural changes”270  designed to streamline the due process 
proceedings and, in some cases, strengthen parents’ positions in due 
process.271  He proposes (a) amending IDEA to allow parents who prevail 
in due process to recover expert witness fees; (b) relaxing the rules about 
exhaustion of administrative proceedings; (c) streamlining due process 
proceedings by, among other things, minimizing pre-hearing motion 
practice; (e) enhancing the training of IHOs; and (e) clarifying the means to 
enforce a settlement reached in a special education dispute.272   
   
III. THE SURVEY 
 
In 2014, I decided to survey special education attorneys regarding the 
current due process structure and facets of some of the proposals described 
above.  The idea to conduct a survey came from anecdotal conversations 
with special education attorneys in Ohio about due process.273  These 
attorneys opined that the resolution session usually was a waste of the 
parties’ time.  They also expressed the view that the hearing officer system 
in Ohio was deficient in many respects, a view that Professor Ruth Colker 
266 Id. 
267 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 9-10. 
268 Id. at 10. 
269 Id. at  9-10.  The AASA report reports that just seven percent of districts had six to 
ten due process hearings within the last five years and three percent of districts had eleven 
or more hearings over the same period. 
270 Weber, supra note 14, at 520. 
271 Id.  
272 Id. at 520-23. 
273 I teach a course in Special Education law and, during the semester, I invite area 
attorneys who practice special education law to come and speak with my class.  For several 
years, I and my students have been lucky enough to have two highly experienced attorneys 
come to share their views.  Kerry Agins is a well-respected attorney in the Cleveland area 
who represents parents and their children in special education disputes.  See 
http://www.siegelaginsandgilman.com/About-Kerry-Agins.html.  Kathryn Perrico is 
another excellent special education attorney whose clients are school districts and 
personnel.  See http://www.ohioedlaw.com/kathryn-i-perrico.   
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outlined in a recent article.274  These conversations piqued my interest in 
ascertaining what practitioners thought about the current structure and 
proposals to change the structure. 
Once I decided to create a survey, I considered the topics that might be 
covered.  I was very interested in obtaining practitioners’ views about the 
effectiveness of the resolution session.  I also was very interested in hearing 
practitioners’ views about IEP facilitation.  Finally, I wanted to get 
feedback on both the voluntary, binding arbitration model and aspects of the 
AASA proposal.   
To those topics, I added a topic that has not received a great deal of in-
depth attention in the scholarship, namely the relative benefits or costs of a 
one-tier due process structure, as opposed to a two-tier due process.275  
Again, it was my Ohio-based focus that caused me to be interested in this 
topic.  Ohio is one of just eight states with a two-tier structure.276   
For two reasons, I omitted any questions about the use of mediation to 
settle special education disputes.  First, the use of mediation as a means to 
resolve special education disputes is so widely accepted that any further 
amendments to IDEA likely would not address mediation.277  Second, given 
all of the other topics to be covered and a concern that the survey would 
become excessively long, I decided to omit mediation as a topic.  
My target audience was attorneys who are actively engaged in the 
practice of special education law.278  I did not quantify the target population 
of special education attorneys nationwide.  Rather, I attempted to reach as 
many special education attorneys as I could through a variety of efforts.   
First, I contacted non-profit organizations, including the Education Law 
274 Colker, supra note 69.. 
275 Id. at 406. 
276 The survey did also ask a number of questions about quality and training of hearing 
officers, however, that topic will be the subject of a later article. 
277 See e.g., Feinberg, supra note 169, at 8 (indicating high levels of satisfaction with 
the use of mediation to resolve special education disputes). 
278 There are special education “lay advocates,” who assist parents in seeking special 
education services but may not handle due process matters or litigation.  For information 
about the use of law advocates, see Eileen M. Ahern, THE INVOLVEMENT OF LAW 
ADVOCATES IN DUE PROCESS HEARINGS (October 2001), available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/The_Involv4449.cfm; see also Kay Hennessy Seven 
& Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons:  Construction of the IDEA’s Lay Advocate 
Provision Too Narrow, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193 (2002).   
I recognize that lay advocates can provide invaluable services to parents.  Id. at 212-14 
(discussing the value of lay advocates in the field of special education).  However, because 
lay advocates may include individuals who do not handle due process or otherwise make 
strategic legal decisions in a dispute, I sought to limit their involvement in the survey by 
asking the survey respondents whether they were “an attorney with an active practice in 
Education Law” and filtering responses based on the answer.   
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Association,279 The National School Boards Association,280 and the Council 
of Parent Attorneys and Advocates.281  I asked those organizations to 
distribute the survey to their members, and they agreed to do so, for which I 
thank them.282  Second, I contacted individual attorneys whose names and 
email addresses I obtained by searching websites with lists of special 
education practitioners.283  Third, I searched on the Internet to find 
attorneys who advertised their expertise in special education law.284  I also 
reviewed the publicly-available special education due process decisions to 
find the names and contact information for counsel who had represented 
parties in due process hearings.285 
The survey was an anonymous and voluntary one that respondents 
completed online.286  The survey respondents were able to exit the survey at 
any time.  The survey was designed to obtain both quantitative and 
qualitative information through the use of both Likert-type questions and 
open-ended questions with space for the respondents to provide narrative 
answers. 
Responses were collected between June 23, 2014 and November 18, 
2014.  Three hundred and ninety-three individuals completed the survey.287  
Of that number, 355 respondents had an active practice in education law.  
One hundred and sixty-six of respondents indicated that he or she had an 
279 www.educationlaw.org. 
280 www.nsba.org. 
281 www.copaa.org 
282 Emails from Cate Smith, Executive Director of ELA, Sonja Trainor, Director, 
Council of School Attorneys of NASB, and Denise Marshall, Executive Director of 
COPAA are on file with the author. 
283 See, e.g., http://www.yellowpagesforkids.com; 
http://www.autismspeaks.org/resource-guide/by-state/81/Attorneys/OH; 
http://www.quakerschool.org/resources/special-education-attorneys; 
http://advocatesforspecialeducation.com/index.html; 
http://www.mnmsba.org/Resources/COSA;  
284 See, e.g., http://www.specialneedsnewyork.com/attorneys; 
http://www.specialeducationattorneyatlaw.com; http://www.wefight4you.com/california-
attorneys/hans-gillinger. 
285 See, e.g., http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Special-
Education-Services/Pages/Due-Process-Hearing-Decisions-.aspx; 
http://www.edresourcesohio.org/due-process-decisions.  In some states, the attorney- 
identifying information is redacted.   
286 The survey was designed using Qualtrics software licensed to the University of 
Akron.  The survey was exempt from IRB review by the University of Akron’s 
Institutional Review Board.  A letter to that effect is on file with the author.  The survey 
questions also are on file with the author. 
287 Five hundred and eighty-one individuals began the survey, yielding a dropout rate 
of thirty-two percent.  I solicited responses from practitioners in the fifty U.S. states and the 
District of Columbia. 
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active practice representing school districts, boards of education or school 
personnel, of which ninety-four of those individuals (57%) indicated that 
100% of their clients were school-related personnel or entities.288 Two 
hundred and forty-three of respondents indicated that his or her clients were 
parents and/or children seeking rights under IDEA; one hundred and sixteen 
of those attorneys (48%) indicated that 100% of the clients were parents and 
children.289 
 
A.  IEP Facilitation. 
 
The survey first asked whether the respondents had any experience with 
IEP facilitation.  One hundred and seventeen of the school district attorneys 
indicated that they had experience with IEP facilitation.  One hundred and 
forty of the parent-child attorneys indicated that they had experience with 
IEP facilitation.290   
Broken into those subgroups, the school district attorneys were more 
positive about the use of IEP facilitation as a means to resolve disputes.  
When asked whether IEP facilitation was a “valuable vehicle to resolve 
disagreements quickly,” and provided with a Likert-type scale,291 twelve 
school district attorneys (11%) strongly agreed with that proposition, and 
fifty-two (49%) agreed with the proposition.292  Twelve school district 
attorneys (11%) disagreed with the proposition, and four (4%) strongly 
disagreed with the proposition.  
Of the parent-child attorneys who responded to the same question, just 
five (4%) strongly agreed with the proposition, while thirty-three 
individuals (29%) agreed with the proposition.  Thirty-three parent-child 
attorneys (29%) disagreed with the proposition, and another ten (9%) 
strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
Twenty-six school district attorneys (25%) and thirty-four of the parent-
288 Ninety-four respondents (57%) indicated that 100% of clients were school-related 
personnel or entities.  Fifty-seven respondents (34%) indicated that 76-99% of clients were 
school-related personnel or entities, and another fifteen respondents (9%) indicates that 
between 51-75% of clients were school-related personnel or entities. 
289 One hundred and sixteen respondents (48%) indicated that 100% of clients were 
parents/children.  Ninety-six respondents (40%) indicated that 76-99% of clients were 
parents/children, and another thirty-one respondents (13%) indicates that between 51-75% 
of clients were parents/children. 
290 The term “school district attorney” refers to survey respondents who represent 
school districts or school personnel.  The term “parent-child attorney” refers to  survey 
respondents parents and children. 
291 The survey gave five possible responses:  strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree 
nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree.  
292 Because the survey respondents were allowed to skip questions in the survey, the 
number of respondents changes slightly from question to question. 
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child attorneys (30%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition, 
taking essential a neutral stance on the value of IEP facilitation. 
The use of IEP facilitation as a means to avoid due process received 
mixed results.  Of the school district attorneys, just seven respondents (7%) 
strongly agreed that IEP facilitation “often resolves disagreements, thereby 
avoiding the filing of a due process complaint.”  Thirty-eight school district 
attorneys (37%) agreed with the proposition.  Thirty school district 
attorneys (29%) neither agreed nor disagreed, twenty-six school district 
attorneys (25%) disagreed with the proposition, and three (3%) strongly 
disagreed with the proposition.  
The parent-child attorneys were more negative about the use of IEP 
facilitation as a means to resolve disagreements and avoid the filing of a due 
process complaint.  Just five parent-child attorneys (4%) strongly agreed 
with the proposition.  Twenty-six parent-child attorneys (23%) agreed with 
the proposition; twenty-four (21%) neither agreed nor disagreed, forty-eight 
(43%) disagreed, and nine (8%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
 The narrative comments provided by the survey respondents were most 
revealing about their views.  Overall, the respondents indicated that IEP 
facilitation – in concept – could be an effective means to resolve disputes, 
as noted by the following comments:   
 
• “I think it is an excellent way to resolve disputes. Unfortunately, 
it is not always enough to resolve the parties[’] differences, but 
when it is, it saves the District money and generally results in a 
better program for the students.  Also, it fosters relationship 
building, rather than breaking relationships down.”  
 
• “IEP facilitation is an excellent way to keep the IEP process on 
track in terms of coverage of topics, management of time and 
management of conflicting personalities.” 
 
• “IEP facilitation provides a means for parents and school 
officials to retain some control over educational issues on a local 
basis, which is where the decisions should be made.  It is much 
less costly than due process hearing litigation and less arbitrary 
than the agency complaint process.” 
 
• “It is particularly useful for those cases where there have been 
multiple IEP team meetings and personalities have stood in the 
way in terms of meaningful discussion.” 
However, attorneys on both sides of the table agreed that the success 
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of IEP facilitation was highly dependent on the facilitator’s skill and 
training.  One parent-child attorney noted: “The idea is a good one and has 
the potential to work but it is entirely dependent on the individual 
characteristics of the facilitator.”  A school district attorney similarly stated: 
“I strongly believe that IEP facilitation is valuable if the facilitator is trained 
using a practical, usable approach and knows IDEA requirements well.”293   
Yet there seemed to be agreement that training of IEP facilitators 
currently is a barrier to effective use of the procedure.  One survey 
respondent stated: “I do not believe that IEP facilitation is being conducted 
by highly qualified individuals.  The facilitators have not been effective in 
resolving contentious matters.  Their function appeared to be nothing more 
than conducting the meeting.”  Another comment was: “I have never 
encountered any facilitator who has specific training and experience in 
facilitating IEP meetings.  They are ‘borrowed’ from other disciplines in the 
hope that their presence will somehow add value to the process.  Usually 
they are superfluous to the process.”  One individual succinctly stated: 
“Facilitators need far more training to make the experience valuable.”294 
Interestingly, there were a few comments from attorneys on both sides 
of the table indicating that the facilitators demonstrated bias towards one 
party or the other.  A school district attorney stated: “I do not discourage my 
clients from agreeing to IEP facilitation.  However, the majority of reports I 
receive after the fact is that the facilitator spent most of the meeting trying 
to convince the District to provide what the family was requested.  My 
clients often feel that the process is one-sided.”  A parent-child attorney 
stated: “Unfortunately, the facilitators I have worked with are often biased, 
favoring the schools and school districts. Parents sense that bias and then 
doubt the opinions of the facilitator.” 
In addition, both school district attorneys and parent-child attorneys 
recognized that IEP facilitation could not resolve all disputes, in particular 
those disputes where the parties have clearly communicated their positions 
and simply disagree as to the appropriate course of action for the child.  
Representative comments included: 
 
• I only find IEP facilitation helpful when Districts and Parents are 
having trouble communicating, but not when there is a 
293 Another similar comment was: “I think that the facilitation process is theoretically 
desirable, but a huge amount depends on the neutrality, knowledge and skill of the 
facilitator, as well as the sophistication of the parents.” 
294 A more barbed comment from a school district attorney was: “The facilitators I 
have worked with are spectacularly ill-informed about the law and about special education 
generally.  They frequently suggest "compromises" that will address parental concerns but 
that do not appropriately serve the child or that totally ignore IDEA requirements like RTI, 
LRE and the like.” 
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substantive issue regarding the appropriateness of placement or 
services.   
 
• I believe it is a valuable means to solve disputes arising out of 
miscommunication. I have not found it is a helpful means to 
resolve disputes arising out of disagreement with assessment 
results[,] current levels of performance and best practice with 
service delivery[,] times[,] amounts and different types of 
providers.   
 
• It can be beneficial, but when parents are lawyered up following 
unilateral placement and the only issues remaining are a 
monetary demand, there is no need for attention to an IEP; it's all 
about money. 
 
• Facilitation is a tool to assist parties to find common ground and 
reach agreement.  When one party approaches the IEP meeting 
with a fixed goal / outcome and is unable / unwilling to consider 
alternatives, facili[t]ation may help to highlight the differences 
but not facilitate a resolution. 
The survey also asked if IEP facilitation should be mandated under 
IDEA as a prerequisite that must be satisfied before a due process complaint 
can be filed.  An overwhelming majority of the parent-child attorneys 
(88%) answered “No.”295  A majority of the school district attorneys (57%) 
also answered “No.”296   
When asked to explain their answers, those survey respondents who 
favored mandatory IEP facilitation generally focused on the cost of due 
process.  For example, one survey respondent stated: “[D]ue process is very 
expensive and the parties should be forced through several different 
procedures prior to going to ‘court.’"  Another point in favor of mandatory 
IEP facilitation was that the mandatory meeting would make clear to all 
parties that a dispute is on the horizon.  In particular, one school district 
attorney commented:  “Too many times, due process hearings are filed 
without any attempts to engage the school district in meaningful 
communication about the pending issues.  This results in fractured feelings 
between the school personnel and the family.”   
Those respondents not in favor of mandating IEP facilitation focused on 
two main issues.  First, many respondents commented on the low 
probability of success in mandating a meeting in which the focus is 
295 Four percent of parent-child attorneys had no opinion, and 7% answered “Yes.” 
296 Six percent of school district attorneys had no opinion, and 38% answered “Yes.”   
                                                 
[] EVERY DAY COUNTS 39 
collaboration: “It should never be required. If the parties do no[t] wish to do 
it on their own, it will not be successful.”  Another similar comment was:  
“The fact that this is a voluntary process aid[]s the parties in reaching 
resolution because they already have to be predisposed to it. Forcing the 
facilitation where the parties are not willing to resolve their differences will 
likely prove futile and frustrating and delay the process of getting to hearing 
and reaching resolution.”297 
The second main issue was the burden that would result by adding 
another layer to the process.  One school district attorney stated: “There are 
already resolution meetings or mediation requirements. No need to add a 
redundant layer of ADR.”  A parent-child attorney similarly commented: “It 
would require an additional procedural step that might delay the parents' 
right to a speedy hearing.”298 Yet another survey respondent stated: 
“Resolution sessions are already fruitless in 98% of cases.  Adding another 
layer will not help at all.”299 
 
B.  Voluntary Binding Arbitration. 
 
The survey next asked whether the respondent would support a 
procedure for voluntary, binding arbitration of special education disputes.300  
Again, the response was largely negative.  One hundred and thirty-nine 
parent-child attorneys (67%) answered “No.”  Seventy-seven school district 
attorneys (57%) also answered “No.”  Forty-seven parent-child attorneys 
(23%) attorneys answered ‘Yes,” while forty-six school district attorneys 
(33%) answered “Yes.”  The remainder of both groups had no opinion.301 
 The survey allowed the respondents to choose among a series of 
reasons why voluntary, binding arbitration might, or might not be, a 
297 A parent-child attorney stated: “There are too many variables that can result in a 
poor relationship between parents and school district personnel -- on both sides.  I have 
seen situations where forcing a facilitated IEP meeting would only serve to increase the 
trauma for the parents and further polarize the parties.” 
298 Another similar comment was: “At times litigation is necessary and mandating 
facilitation could be used as a delay tactic by school.” 
299 A school district attorney noted: “A resolution session is already mandatory.  
Unless there is to be absolutely stellar training for facilitators, it should not be required.” 
300 The question read:  “Should IDEA include voluntary, binding arbitration as 
a dispute resolution mechanism?  Assume that the arbitration panel would consist of a 
(non-lawyer) expert in the child's suspected disability, a special educator with experience 
administering IDEA's provisions, and a lawyer familiar with special education law, 
including dispute resolution.  Also assume that the arbitration decision would be binding 
with no right of appeal.  Both parties would have to agree to arbitration.  The costs would 
be borne by the state.”  
301 Twenty parent-child attorneys (10%) had no opinion, while eighteen school district 
attorneys (13%) had no opinion. 
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valuable ADR mechanism.  One hundred and forty-five parent-child 
attorneys (73%) cited the lack of an appeal right as a reason not to support 
voluntary, binding arbitration; the lack of an appeal right was cited by sixty-
two school district attorneys (48%) as a potential reason not to support 
voluntary, binding arbitration.  Sixty-eight school district attorneys (53%) 
indicated that, so long as arbitration was an option that the parties could 
choose voluntarily, it could be included in IDEA.  Seventy parent-child 
attorneys (35%) also agreed with that proposition. 
 
C.  The Resolution Session 
 
The survey also asked about the respondents’ experiences with the 
resolution session.  When asked whether the resolution session was a 
valuable vehicle to resolve special education disputes quickly, attorneys on 
both sides of the table essentially said “No.”  Just eight school district 
attorneys (6%) strongly agreed with the proposition; another forty-five 
school district attorneys (35%) agreed with the proposition.  Over one-third 
of school district attorneys either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition, while nearly one-quarter of the school district attorneys 
essentially took no position.302   
The parent-child attorneys were even more negative about the use of the 
resolution session as a means to resolve disputes. Just five parent-child 
attorneys (3%) strongly agreed that the resolution session was a valuable 
vehicle to resolve disputes quickly.  Another twenty-eight individuals 
(15%) agreed with the proposition.  However, over sixty percent of the 
parent-child attorneys disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition, 
while the remainder had no opinion.303   
When asked whether, based on experience, the respondents had 
“substantial success” in resolving special education disputes at the 
resolution session, the survey respondents generally answered in the 
negative.  One-half of the school district attorneys indicated that, in their 
experience, the resolution session had not resulted in substantial success.304  
302 Twenty-eight school district attorneys (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
proposition.  Thirty-two school district attorneys (25%) disagreed with the proposition, and 
sixteen others (12%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
303 Forty parent-child attorneys (21%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
proposition.  Fifty-eight parent-child attorneys (30%) disagreed with the proposition and 
another sixty individuals (31%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
304 The question was a Likert-type question that asked the respondents to agree with 
the proposition.  Just four school district attorneys (3%) strongly agreed with the 
proposition.  Twenty-seven individuals (21%) agreed with the proposition, and another 
thirty-three individuals (26%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition.  Forty-
four school district attorneys (35%) disagreed with the proposition, and an additional 
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Two-thirds of the parent-child attorneys indicated that the resolution session 
had not been substantially successful in resolving disputes.305 
The results were very similar in response to a question whether the 
parties “most often” do not resolve a special education dispute at the 
resolution session.  Again, over one-half of the school district attorneys 
indicated that, in their experience, the parties did not often resolve a special 
education dispute during the resolution session.306  Nearly three-quarters of 
the parent-child attorneys indicated that, in their experiences, the resolution 
session often did not resolve a special education dispute.307 
Again, the narrative comments of the survey respondents were telling.  
One school district attorney stated: “Many school districts do not agree to it 
because they see it as an unproductive step which only incurs extra costs for 
them.”  Another school district attorney stated:  “It's a waste of time.  We 
almost always waive the resolution session and proceed directly to 
mediation.  The presence of a mediator usually goes a long way toward 
helping the parties reach an agreement.”  Similarly, a parent-child attorney 
stated: “Resolution sessions are ineffective because most often it consists of 
the same individuals arguing over the same issues they couldn't resolve at 
an IEP meeting.  There is no one new involved in the process.  It just 
unnecessarily delays resolution [of] the matter.” 
Parent-child attorneys expressed concerns that school districts use the 
resolution session to gain “free discovery” about the other side’s case in 
advance of a due process hearing.  One parent-child attorney stated: “The 
resolution session/period simply causes delays. School District[]s do not use 
it to resolve matters, but instead use it as a means of intimidating the parent, 
delaying the proceedings, and/or a form of discovery in preparation for the 
hearing.”  This use of the resolution session as a litigation strategy by 
school district was reflected in several comments of parent-child attorneys.  
nineteen individuals (15%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
305 Four parent-child attorneys (2%) strongly agreed with the proposition.  Twenty-five 
individuals (13%) agreed with the proposition, and another thirty-five individuals (18%) 
neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition.  Forty-six parent-child attorneys (24%) 
disagreed with the proposition, and an additional eighty parent-child attorneys (42%) 
strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
306 Eighteen school district attorneys (14%) strongly agreed with the proposition.  
Forty-nine individuals (38%) agreed with the proposition, and another twenty-eight 
individuals (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition.  Twenty-nine school 
district attorneys (23%) disagreed with the proposition, and an additional four school 
district attorneys (3%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
307 Seventy-six parent-child attorneys (40%) strongly agreed with the proposition.  
Twenty-seven individuals (33%) agreed with the proposition, and another twenty-eight 
individuals (15%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition.  Twenty parent-child 
attorneys (11%) disagreed with the proposition, and just four individuals (2%) strongly 
disagreed with the proposition. 
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For example, one individual stated: “In my view, the resolution session 
never focuses on resolution of the parents' claims, but instead focuses on the 
district's attempt to take discovery and to strengthen its litigation 
position.”308  
And at least one school district attorney approached this issue with a 
slightly different focus, stating: “From a school attorney's perspective, 
voluntary mediation tends to be far more effective if used in that both 
parties seem to take comfort in and benefit from the facilitation of a neutral 
third-party. If the parties couldn't work out their issues at an IEP meeting or 
otherwise, sitting together again at a resolution session is usually not helpful 
to resolve the case. It can, however, be useful in creating a record of what a 
district tried to do to resolve a case since the documentation is admissible at 
a due process hearing (unlike mediation documentation).”   
Several survey respondents also noted that the resolution session is 
poorly placed in the dispute resolution system to be effective.  One survey 
respondent stated:  “As to an actual resolution session conducted by the 
school district, I find them to be lar[]gely unhelpful because there is no 
neutral party to help rebuild the trust and open the lines of communication 
between the parties, they have low rates of success in my experience, and 
simply unnecessarily delay the due process case.”  A school district attorney 
noted: 
 
Although it has been effective, that is rare.  Typically, it 
takes formal mediation for true resolution to occur.  The 
resolution session is usually a rehashing of the issues 
included in the due process hearing request.  I think it also 
occurs too early--if the parents filed for due process, then 
they are still really angry and ready to litigate, and the school 
is very defensive at having been sued.  After a little time 
passes and litigation becomes more involved and time-
consuming, the parties are usually ready to resolve it and be 
done the whole process.309 
 
308 Another parent-child attorney similarly commented:  “Resolution sessions are used 
by school districts to repeat their last offer, try to bully parents, and try to obtain early 
discovery of whatever information parent might have to use against them when they don't 
settle the case.”  
309 Echoing similar thoughts, one parent-child attorney commented: “I think that the 
resolution session is generally a waste of time for parents, is confusing for them, because 
the school does little of significance to change their position, and the school uses it as free 
discovery and to maneuver the parent into a weaker position. As there is no outside actor, 
e.g., a mediator, I don't think there is anything about the resolution session that could not 
be resolved by the district in direct discussions with the parents at an IEP meeting.” 
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Finally, another concern was the complicating factor about payment of 
attorneys’ fees for represented parents.  One school district attorney stated: 
“Often, in the district I represent, the parent's attorneys refuse to allow them 
to attend resolution for fear they will settle without addressing attorney's 
fees.”  A parent-child attorney stated: “It's just another meeting with the 
same parties to the disagreement.  Unlikely to resolve anything and you 
can't get attorney fees.”   
 
D.  One-Tier v. Two-Tier Structure. 
 
The survey then inquired about the one-tier and two-tier due process 
structures.  Seventy-seven survey respondents indicated that they had 
experience litigating in a jurisdiction with a two-tier system.310  Of those 
seventy-seven respondents, forty-six (60%) indicated that they would prefer 
a one-tier structure over a two-tier structure.  Nine respondents (12%) had 
no opinion, and twenty-two (29%) indicated that they preferred the two-tier 
structure.311 
Using Likert-type questions, the survey posited reasons why a two-tier 
administrative structure might or might not be advantageous.  The survey 
asked whether a two-tier structure was preferable because the second level 
of review would issue a decision faster than if the case were directly 
appealed to state or federal court.  Just one respondent (2%) strongly agreed 
with that proposition.  An additional thirteen respondents (20%) agreed with 
the proposition; however, nearly two-thirds of the respondents either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition.312 
The survey also asked the respondents whether the second level of 
review decreased the likelihood that a party would file suit in federal or 
state court.  The purpose of the question was to determine the practitioners’ 
opinions whether a two-tier structure reduced court filings.  Not a single 
survey respondent strongly agreed with this proposition.  Nineteen 
respondents (29%) agreed with the proposition.  Twenty-six individuals 
(40%) disagreed with the proposition that the second level of review would 
decrease appeals to state or federal court, and eight individuals (12%) 
310 Those jurisdictions are:  Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma and South Carolina.  North Carolina has a “modified one-tier” system in 
which both administrative levels are conducted by the State.  See O.M. v. Orange Cnty. 
(N.C.) Bd. of Educ., 2013 WL 664900, at *11 (M.D.N.C., Feb. 23, 2013). 
311 Because only seventy-seven individuals indicated that they had experience with a 
two-tier structure, I did not divide the total into subgroups by client representation. 
312 Nine respondents (14%) had no opinion.  Twenty-three respondents (35%) 
disagreed with the proposition, and nineteen respondents (29%) strongly disagreed with the 
proposition. 
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strongly disagreed with the proposition.313  Thus, just over one-half of the 
survey respondents indicated that, in their opinion, the second level of 
review does not decrease further appeals to state or federal court. 
The survey then asked the respondents whether the second level of 
review increased the overall costs of IDEA due process.  Seventeen survey 
respondents (27%) strongly agreed with this proposition and an additional 
twenty-three respondents (37%) agreed with the proposition. Just eleven 
survey respondents (17%) disagreed with the proposition, and three (5%) 
strongly disagreed with the proposition.314 
The survey respondents again were given the opportunity to provide 
comments on the issue.  Those who supported a two-tier structure indicated 
that one advantage of a two-tier structure was the opportunity to correct 
errors made at the hearing officer level quickly and inexpensively.  For 
example, one survey respondent noted: “The impartial hearing officer does 
not always apply the law. The two-tier process allows for a review of the 
legal issues involved.”  Another individual commented: “State-level review 
corrects the often hasty and overworked hearing officers, whose decisions 
run the gamut in terms of how bad they can be.”  Yet another opinion was: 
“The second tier really is an appeal but is much less expensive. It gives 
clarity to the issues and has helped avoid costly appeals in court.” 
Those survey respondents who would rather litigate in a one-tier 
structure essentially cited three interrelated reasons to prefer a one-tier 
structure: efficiency, expense, and time.  Many survey respondents 
concisely stated: “speed and simplicity” or “less expense for clients” or 
“[f]aster resolutions.”  Other comments included: “[T]wo tier systems 
require much more manpower, thus a one tier is more efficient for the SEA 
and the families.”315   
In addition, several comments reflected the survey respondents’ strong 
belief that, for those disputes in which a due process hearing is held, the 
case is not over until it had been heard in federal court.  Several respondents 
made reference to federal court as the final decision maker, stating, for 
example: “If the result is unsatisfactory, we would prefer getting that appeal 
into the Courts.”  Another comment was: “No reason for 2 tier!  Get 
through administrative process and go straight to court where we want to be 
anyway!”  Still a third comment was:  “I worked in a state with a one-tier 
structure and felt like it was helpful.  If the parents are intent on getting to 
313 Twelve individuals (18%) had no opinion. 
314 Nine individuals (14%) had no opinion. 
315 Comments included the following:  (a) “A second tier is inefficient, and costly, and 
results in additional delays;” (b) “[t]he process is slow and burdensome;” and (c) “[l]ess 
costly.  The second tier is often a "rubber stamp" of the first level and creates a barrier to 
parents getting into court in a timely manner.”   
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court for their attorney fees no matter what, it gets it done more quickly.”  
And a fourth comment:  “The first truly neutral forum in special ed is 
federal court, and the sooner parties get there the quicker disputes will be 
resol[v]ed.”   
Some survey respondents also stated a belief that the second level of 
review was “political” or that the second level of review was unnecessary 
because the second level was simply a “rubber stamp” of the hearing 
officer’s decision.316 
Three hundred and four survey respondents indicated that they had 
experience litigating in a one-tier structure.  One hundred and eight-six 
respondents (61%) indicated that they preferred the one-tier structure.  
Eighty-eight respondents (29%) had no opinion, and just twenty-nine 
respondents (10%) indicated a preference for a two-tier structure. 
As with those survey respondents with experience litigating in a two-tier 
structure, the reasons for a particular preference were essentially the same.  
Those who preferred a two-tier structure cited the ability to get a quicker 
review of the first-level decision.  One such comment was: “The two-tier 
structure provided a faster review of the decision and, in my opinion, 
resulted in fewer federal court appeals.  Now, it seems that every due 
process decision is re-litigated in federal court, which often takes years.”  
Similarly, those respondents who preferred a one-tier structure cited issues 
of cost and delay.  One individual stated: “Efficiency, as it permits the court 
to directly review the findings and conclusions of the IHO.”  Another 
comment was: “Two tier is too lengthy and expensive; would rather head to 
court directly.” 
Of particular interest were the comments from survey respondents who 
had experience in a state that had moved from a two-tier to a one-tier 
system.  Examples of such comments included: 
 
• “I have litigated under BOTH systems as Arizona used to be a 
two tier process. The two tier process simply adds another layer 
316 For example, one respondent stated: “In Nevada the second tier has been a waste of 
time.  A rubber stamp of the decision.”  Another similar comment was: “The SLRO level in 
Ohio is not[h]ing more than a rubber stamping of the IHO level.  Also, if Ohio were a one-
tier system with costs borne by the state, filings would likely decrease and/or settlement 
would increase.”   
The issue of bias or politics was a recurring theme from practitioners with experience 
in New York.  One representative comment was: “It reduces the machinations of political 
manipulation.  Here in NYC the Department often appeals (Albany SRO) and the IHO 
decision often is reversed, those parents that proceed to federal court often result in the 
IHO decision being re-instated at either the District / appellate Circuit level.  The politics in 
NYS (Albany) are 'intricate' to say the least.  A one tier system in NYS would remove a 
layer of manipulation (political) often to the detriment of the handicapped child.”   
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for district attorneys to bill or for parents to be burdened.  I find 
that the hearing officer's decisions in Arizona are very thorough 
and only one has ever been appealed by the district.  When we 
used a two tier system, the decisions were not as thorough and 
many more were appealed.” 
 
• “We had a two-tier system in Illinois until 1997 and it was often 
utilized, thus prolonging the litigation and final outcome of a 
case.” 
 
• “Disputes are resolved more quickly, and I believe that parents 
have a better chance of prevailing in a face to face hearing than 
on a cold record. (I practice in Pennsylvania, which used to have 
a 2-tier system.)” 
 
• “Pennsylvania was previously a two-tier jurisdiction which 
provided inconsistent decisions among the appellate panels and 
costing parents more resources to litigate the issue.” 
 
• “Virginia used to have a two tiered system and changed to a one 
tier.  I prefer the one tier as we can get to court more quickly if 
we do not settle.  When we had a 2-tier system, final resolution 
was delayed.” 
In addition, there were multiple comments that indicated that, for these 
practitioners, disputes almost invariably include an appeal to federal court.  
One respondent stated: “It's often better to get the matter to court so that we 
can get a resolution.”  Another similar comment was: “Being able to go 
right to federal court gets us swifter and fairer relief in our cases.”317  Other 
comments reflected the opinion that federal court was the preferred venue 
because of the quality of decision making.  One comment was: “Because 
better decisions are often rendered at the federal court level.”  Yet another 
survey respondent stated: “The federal court can review the decision of the 
hearing officer who actually heard the case, assessed credibility, considered 
the factual and legal claims, and then issued the final decision and not 
another adjudicator who simply reviewed the transcripts and exhibits. A 
second tier system contributes to unnecessary delays. I do not think a 
second tier adjudicator is better qualified to determine whether a hearing 
317 Another similar comment was: “Because I believe justice is better served when the 
parties litigate through the administrative process and then resort to the courts instead of 
belaboring the process to the point where it is so expensive and time-consuming that each 
side is exhausted before an article 3 judge ever gets to see the case.” 
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officer was correct or not.”  Another similar comment was: “We have a full 
opportunity to establish a record and present arguments at the 
administrative hearing.  I see no reason to include an additional forum 
before appeals may be made to court.  I do not support any dispute 
resolution session that delays decisions for children in special education 
matters.”   
 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This Part sets forth a series of recommendations with regard to the 
structure of IDEA due process.  These recommendations do not address 
proposals for change within the existing structure, although I do support 
several of these intra-system changes.318  The following recommendations, 
however, focus on the structure – the meeting, hearings or procedures that 
do, or should, take place in a special education dispute.  
 
A.  Offer IEP Facilitation, But Do Not Mandate Its Use 
 
Based on a review of the literature and the survey results, IEP 
facilitation appears to be an effective ADR mechanism, particularly if the 
parties quickly recognize the need for a neutral third-party’s involvement 
early in the process.319  As a form of ADR that occurs “upstream,”320 before 
either party has filed a due process complaint, IEP facilitation is particularly 
helpful in resolving disputes at an early stage.  For this reason, any 
amendments to IDEA should require every state to develop a program of 
IEP facilitation.  Since twenty-nine states currently have such a program in 
place, with several other states beginning to consider or develop 
programs,321 it seems worthwhile to “nationalize” the practice.  Indeed, it is 
worth noting that four of the most active jurisdictions for special education 
due process filings – California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York – do 
318 In particular, I support Professor Weber’s proposal to ease the exhaustion 
requirement and the call for additional low-cost or pro bono legal services for low-income 
parents seeking special education services for their children.  See Parts II.C.2. and II.C.5., 
supra. 
319 See Henderson, supra note 165, at 9-10. 
320 Erin R. Archerd, et. al., The Ohio State University Dispute Resolution in Special 
Education Symposium Panel, 30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.. RESOL. 89, 94 (2014); CTR. FOR 
APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Four Exemplary Dispute 
Resolution Systems in Special Education 2  (June 2010) 
(http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Combined%20State%20Profiles.pdf) (noting 
that exemplary systems have “early upstream dispute resolution processes”). 
321 See Part II.C.1., supra. 
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not have a statewide program of IEP facilitation.322 
If Congress does add a requirement that IEP facilitation be available in 
all states, Congress also should provide the states with minimum 
requirements for IEP facilitation programs.  Guidance is necessary to avoid 
the “considerable variability”323 among the states that exists both with 
regard to the mechanics of IEP facilitation and “those who serve as 
facilitators.”324 
First, the federal government should develop guidelines for the training 
of IEP facilitators.  While a facilitator should neither judge the parties’ 
various proposals nor draft an IEP, to effectively facilitate an IEP meeting, 
the facilitator must understand the underlying legal and educational issues.  
Therefore, facilitators need to understand special education laws including, 
at a minimum, IDEA’s LRE requirement,325 behavioral interventions and 
strategies,326 the use of RTI,327 IDEA’s discipline provisions,328 availability 
of ESY,329 availability of related services and transition services,330 and 
compensatory education,331 among others.  Facilitators also should be 
familiar with best practices for writing IEPs.  Finally, facilitators also need 
to understand various teaching methodologies for educating children with 
disabilities and the range of education placements for children with 
disabilities.   
It seems that a good understanding of special education law and 
educational methodologies is missing from some current IEP facilitation 
training materials.  Training materials largely focus on general conflict 
resolution skills such as setting ground rules for the parties, effective 
communication techniques, dealing with emotional parties and the like.332 
322 Id.   
323 See document entitled “IEP Facilitation Background and Context” (available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/IEPFacilitationBackgroundContextJobDescripti
on.pdf). 
324 Id. 
325 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012). 
326 For an in-depth discussion of behavioral interventions, see Elizabeth A. Shaver, 
Should the States Ban the Use of Non-Positive Interventions in Special Education?  Re-
Examining Positive Behavior Supports Under the IDEA, ___ STETSON L. REV. __ (2015). 
327 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B) (2012).  For a critical analysis of the use of RTI, see 
Colker, supra note 191, at 227-29). 
328 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(E) (2012). 
329 34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2007). 
330 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) & (26) & (34) (2012). 
331 See note 152, supra. 
332  CADRE’s description of current IEP facilitation practices indicates that, while 
experience as a “facilitator or mediator is usually required” to be an IEP facilitator, a 
“background in special education or knowledge about special education programs or law is 
sometimes considered desirable.” CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL 
EDUC, Job Description: IEP/IFSP Facilitator, available at 
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Indeed, that omission might be deliberate, guard against overreach by the 
facilitator who otherwise might judge the content of the parties’ proposals 
or, even worse, act as an advocate for one party or the other.333  Whatever 
the reasons, it seems that IEP facilitators currently receive only “a 
thumbnail familiarity with the IEP environment” as part of their training.334   
Those concerns are valid.  However, it seems intuitive – and the 
comments of survey respondents confirm – that an effective facilitator 
should have a good working knowledge of the substantive topics being 
discussed.  This is particularly true if one goal of IEP facilitation is to level 
the playing field between school officials and unsophisticated parents.335  
The facilitator, while not providing legal advice, should have enough 
working knowledge to discern whether the substantive discussion comports 
with IDEA’s requirements. 
In addition, facilitators need to understand the limits of the IEP 
facilitation process.  A good facilitator should be able to identify a dispute 
that cannot be resolved via IEP facilitation and engage in a frank discussion 
with the parties about the limits of the process.  An example of such a 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/IEPFacilitationBackgroundContextJobDescripti
on.pdf; see also Presentation by Julie Armbrust, Mediation Northwest, IEP Facilitation: 
Tips of the Trade, at 2 (Oct. 1, 2010), available at  
http://www.ode.state.or.us/wma/teachlearn/conferencematerials/sped/2010/iepfacilitationtr
aining.pdf (training materials prepared for school administrators in Oregon de-emphasizes 
knowledge of the law as a skill in a pyramidal visual where “conflict resolution” and 
“facilitation” skills appear at the wider parts of the pyramid and “knowledge of special 
education law” at the narrow top of the pyramid); Webinar presented by Trisha Bergin-
Lytton, IEP/IFSP Facilitation Techniques for Success (July 10, 2012), available at   
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/7.10.12_IEPIFSPFaciltiationTechforSuccess-
Webinar.pdf (PDF of a PowerPoint presentation of Trisha Bergin-Lytton regarding IEP 
facilitation techniques for success addresses mediation and facilitation techniques such as 
“consensus-as-you-go” and “counter proposal”); see also The OFFICE FOR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, IEP FACILITATION BROCHURE, available at  http://odr-pa.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/IEP-Facilitation-Brochure-English.pdf; Presentation by the Conflict 
Resolution Ctr. of Baltimore Cnty., Independent IEP Facilitators: What Do They Do? 
What’s in it for YOU? (2012), available at http://crcbaltimorecounty.org/newsite/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/CRC-IEP-Presentation-in-pdf2.pdf. 
333 Trisha Bergin-Lytton, What an IEP/IFSP Facilitator Is and Is Not (Sept. 2011), 
available at http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitator%20Is%20Is%20Not-
FIEP%20(TBL).pdf; Nicholas R.M. Martin, SUPPORTING THE IEP PROCESS: A 
FACILITATOR’S GUIDE 142 (2010) (noting that facilitators may be barred by state 
educational agencies from discussing the substantive law). 
334 Martin, supra note 333, at 142.  This recent text, which is designed to be a 
facilitator’s guide, greatly downplays the notion that IEP facilitators should obtain “content 
knowledge” regarding IDEA provisions, stating that “being familiar enough with the 
terminology to keep up with the discussion is helpful, but not essential, because if the 
facilitator is lost, there is a good chance that others are lost as well.”  Id. 
335 Mueller, supra note 64, at 66. 
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dispute might involve an issue regarding a child’s placement, such as when 
the parents are seeking a private placement that could be expensive for the 
district.  In that circumstance, or any others where the parties are entrenched 
in their positions, the facilitator should recognize that the dispute likely 
cannot be resolved in a facilitated IEP meeting. 
A good program of IEP facilitation also should involve oversight.  
States should develop materials to gauge the effectiveness of facilitators and 
the parties’ satisfaction with the process, including their opinion of the 
particular facilitator. With benefit of the parties’ feedback, the facilitator 
can further refine his or her facilitation skills or legal background.  Another 
benefit of oversight is that the states could determine that a particular 
individual simply is not an effective IEP facilitator and can remove that 
person from the list of available facilitators. 
Some states currently do provide an opportunity for participants in a 
facilitated IEP meeting to provide feedback about the experience.336  In 
particular, CADRE has collaborated with staff from six educational 
agencies, to create an “IEP Facilitation Intensive TA Workgroup,” whose 
mission is to “identify[] and develop[] resources, model policies and 
procedures relating to IEP facilitation.”337  This workgroup has made 
available documents to evaluate the success of a facilitated IEP meeting 
from the perspectives of the parties and the facilitator.338 If IDEA is 
amended to include a program of IEP facilitation, Congress should require 
the states to use such evaluative tools to assess the IEP facilitation program 
on an ongoing basis. 
Finally, IEP facilitation should be a voluntary ADR that the parties may 
choose to use; under no circumstances should the parties be required to 
engage in IEP facilitation.  Specifically, Congress should not adopt the 
AASA proposal that IEP facilitation be a mandatory prerequisite to the 
filing of a special education due process complaint.339 
There are several reasons to reject mandatory IEP facilitation as a layer 
in the due process structure.  First, IEP facilitation simply is not an 
336 See CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., IEP 
Facilitation Training Video Resources (Mar. 2013), available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/fieptrainingvideos.cfm.; Presentation by Julie 
Armbrust, supra note 332; ALLIANCE/CADRE, Facilitated IEP Meetings: An Emerging 
Practice (Nov. 2004), available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CADRE%20Engl
ish.pdf.  
337 CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., IEP Facilitation 
Intensive Workgroup Page (last visited Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/FIEPWorkgroup.cfm. 
338 Id. 
339 See Part II.C.4, supra. 
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appropriate vehicle to resolve every dispute.  Some special education 
disputes do not involve an issue about the child’s IEP.  For example, if a 
school district determined that a child was not eligible for special education 
services, the district would not proceed to write an IEP.  In that 
circumstance, a facilitated IEP meeting is nonsensical.  Other disputes, 
while technically involving the contents of the child’s IEP, also are not 
capable of being resolved in a facilitated IEP meeting.  When parents have 
unilaterally placed their child in private school, the parents cannot obtain 
tuition reimbursement in a facilitated IEP meeting.  If IEP facilitation 
cannot apply to all special education disputes, then it should not be a 
prerequisite to the filing of every special education dispute. 
In addition, mandating IEP facilitation runs counter to its core 
principles.  One core principle is the concept of “self-determination, which 
is a “voluntary, un-coerced decision in which each party makes free and 
informed choices as to process and outcome.”340   Other core principles are 
that open communication and a collaborative environment are keys to 
success.341  If IEP facilitation were mandatory, the parties would not 
perceive the process as one in which they have jointly agreed to make their 
best effort to resolve a dispute.  They would not feel in control of the 
process.  Rather, mandatory IEP facilitation will be viewed as just another 
pre-hearing obstacle.  Indeed, given the goals of IEP facilitation, 
“mandating attendance may be the worst method of encouraging 
cooperation between the school and parents.”342 
This point is particularly important when one considers the long-term 
relationship between parents and their local school district.  Voluntary IEP 
facilitation can foster a collaborative relationship, improve communication 
between the parties, and establish and keep trust that is necessary to serve 
the child.  Mandatory IEP facilitation will cause all participants, regardless 
of their point of view, to perceive the process as something imposed upon 
them by an external force – the law – not as a vehicle they choose to repair 
or maintain an important relationship.   
In that regard, the views of survey respondents are quite telling.  
Regardless of client base, a proposal for mandatory IEP facilitation failed to 
340 See Model Expectations of IEP Facilitator Conduct, available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/artifacts/ModelExpectationsIEPFacilitator
sConduct.pdf; see also Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The 
Problem” in Court-Ordered Mediation, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 863, 871 n.41 (2008) 
(quoting the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators). 
341 Mueller, supra note 11, at 63. 
342 Andrea Shernberg, Mediation as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism for 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 739, 746 
(1997) (discussing proposals for mandatory mediation). 
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gain widespread support.343  The survey respondents recognize that IEP 
facilitation works because it is a voluntary process in which the parties are 
predisposed to reach resolution.  The voluntary nature of the process is 
critical, and it should not be changed. 
 
B.  Eliminate the Resolution Session in Favor of IEP Facilitation 
 
If IDEA is amended to require the states to offer IEP facilitation, 
Congress should eliminate the requirement of a resolution session.  IEP 
facilitation, if done correctly, is a more effective tool to have the parties 
meet and discuss their differences productively.  If the states offer IEP 
facilitation conducted by well-trained facilitators, then the resolution 
session, which essentially is an IEP meeting held after a due process 
complaint is filed, should not be necessary.   
Some might assert that the resolution session should remain in the due 
process structure on the theory that it is always beneficial for the parties to 
meet and discuss their differences.  I disagree.  Each layer in the system 
causes additional cost and delay.  The resolution session in particular causes 
delay since it adds an additional thirty days to the time allotted from the 
filing of a due process complaint until a hearing officer is required to render 
a decision.344   
In addition, the resolution session has not been a “widely used or 
particularly effective” vehicle for resolving disputes.345  In addition, a 
review of data collected by OSEP for the 2011-2012 school year indicates 
that the resolution session has not been effective.  In that time period, 
17,118 due process complaints were filed in the United States and other 
applicable jurisdictions.346  Resolution sessions were held in 54% of the 
matters; thus in nearly one-half of the disputes, the parties jointly agreed to 
waive the resolution session.347  Of the total due process complaints filed, 
343 See Part III.A, supra. 
344 See note 2, supra.  I recognize that, in practice, many due process matters are not 
resolved within the 75-day window allotted for the resolution session and the hearing.  See 
Colker, supra note 69, at 396-97 (noting long delays in resolution of due process hearings 
in Ohio).  The fact that the deadlines may not be adhered to strictly in practice, however, is 
no reason to keep an ineffective procedure like the resolution session in the system when it 
has a defined time delay. 
345 See e.g., Gregory, supra note 253, at 419, n.61 (“In our anecdotal experience, the 
resolution session is not a widely used or particularly effective dispute resolution 
mechanism in Massachusetts”).  
346 Data in includes territories, the Bureau of Indian Education, “outlying areas” and 
“freely associating states.” 
347 See INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, 2011-2012 IDEA Part B Dispute Resolution, 
https://inventory.data.gov/dataset/7c6916d1-c375-4c4c-9de0-
f2b07aac4fc2/resource/5c23f855-4f83-4173-9a08-6928920dd1a6 (last updated July 3, 
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just 11.6% of the disputes were settled during the resolution session.348  
In the most active jurisdictions, the resolution session is only marginally 
successful in resolving a fair number of disputes.349  In the nine 
jurisdictions with the most due process complaints filed (California, District 
of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Puerto Rico, and Texas), the highest settlement rate as a result of the 
resolution session was Puerto Rico, a jurisdiction that only recently has seen 
increased activity in the field of special education disputes.350  In Puerto 
Rico, the resolution sessions resulted in settlements for just under one-
quarter (25%) of all due process complaints filed.351  In the District of 
Columbia, the settlement rate was 20%.352  Three jurisdictions, 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Illinois, had settlement rates of 15.6%, 12.5% and 
10.8% respectively.353  The remaining four jurisdictions, New York, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey and California, had settlement rates of 7.8%, 
3.8%, 2.1% and 1.8% respectively.354  Thus, one-third of the most active 
jurisdictions had settlement rates of less than 5%.  Over one-half of the 
most active jurisdictions had settlement rates of approximately 10% or less.   
The data also indicates that practice varies widely by jurisdiction.  In 
New York, for example, the percentage of due process matters in which a 
resolution session was held was quite high.  Of the 6,116 due process 
complaints filed in New York, a resolution session was held in 5,469 
2014).  
348 Id. 
349 Id. 
350 See Perry A. Zirkel, “Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: A Follow-up 
Analysis,” 303 WEST’S ED. LAW. REP. 1 (2014). 
351 In Puerto Rico, there were 1781 due process complaints filed; of those matters, a 
resolution session was held in 785 matters, or 44.1% of the total.  The resolution session 
settled 439 matters, or 55.7% of the matters in which a resolution session was held, or 
24.6% of the total filings.   See  INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347. 
352 In the District of Columbia, there were 1009 due process complaints filed; of those 
matters, a resolution session was held in 773 matters, or 76.6% of the total.  The resolution 
session settled 208 matters, or 27.0% of the matters in which a resolution session was held 
and 20.6% of the total filings.  Id. 
353 In Pennsylvania, there were 838 due process complaints filed.  Resolution sessions 
were held 374 matters, or 44.6% of the total.  The resolution session settled 131 matters, or 
35.0% of the matters in which a resolution session was held and 15.6% of the total filings.  
In Texas, there were 359 due process complaints filed.  Resolution sessions were held in 
142 matters, or 39.6% of the total.  The resolution session settled 45 matters, or 31.7% of 
the matters in which a resolution session was held and 12.5% of the total filings.  In 
Illinois, 333 due process complaints were filed. Resolution sessions were held in 94 
matters, 28% of the total.  The resolution session settled 36 disputes, or 10.8% of the due 
process complaints that were filed and 38% of the matters in which a resolution session 
was held.  Id.    
354 Data for these four states is set forth in text and footnotes 359 and 359, infra. 
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matters, or 89.4% of the total number of complaints.  That percentage 
greatly exceeded the national average of 54%.  Yet, in New York, the 
resolution session resulted in a settlement in just 7.8% of the due process 
filings, a percentage lower than the national average of 11.6%.  Thus, the 
parties in New York largely attend the resolution session, but have little 
success settling the matter.355  It may be that New York is one of those 
jurisdictions where the resolution session is being used as a litigation 
strategy, either as a means to obtain free discovery or create a record for the 
due process hearing. 
In New Jersey, the resolution session appears to be ineffective for a 
different reason. In New Jersey, there were 801 due process complaints 
filed in the same time period.  Of that total, resolution sessions were held in 
just 20 due process matters, or 2.5% of the total number of complaints.  In 
other words, the parties in New Jersey agreed to waive the resolution 
session for 97.5% of the due process filings.  Of the 20 matters in which a 
resolution session was held, a settlement was reached in 17 matters, or 85% 
of the disputes in which a resolution session was held.  Thus, in New Jersey, 
it appears that the parties largely agree to forego the resolution session – a 
sign that practitioners believe it is ineffective – and agree to meet only when 
it is highly likely that the dispute can be settled at the resolution session.356 
While this data is just a “snapshot,” it bolsters the opinions articulated 
by survey respondents and others357 that the resolution session is 
ineffective.  In New York, the resolution session apparently is ineffective to 
settle matters even when the session takes place.  In New Jersey, the 
resolution session is ineffective as an ADR mechanism simply because the 
parties largely choose not to attend. 
At the time that the resolution session was added to IDEA, 
355 The data for California shows a similar trend. In California, 3114 due process 
complaints were filed in the 2011-2012 school year.  Resolution sessions were held in 457 
matters, approximately 14.6% of the total complaints filed.  The resolution session resolved 
56 disputes – a 1.8% of the total due process complaints filed and just 12.3% of the matters 
in which a resolution session was held.  See  INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347. 
356 Data from Massachusetts is somewhat similar.  In Massachusetts, 582 due process 
complaints were filed, but resolution sessions were held in just 48 matters, 8.2% of the total 
filings for the period.  The resolution session settled 22 disputes, 46% of the total cases in 
which a resolution session was held, but just 3.8% of the total filings.    
 See INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347. 
357 See Archerd, supra note 320, at 92 (noting that Professor Mark Weber, a panelist, 
indicates that mediation is more popular in Illinois than resolution meetings; Professsor 
Robert Dinerstein, another panelist, notes that ADR efforts are largely unsuccessful in the 
District of Columbia); Id. at 140 (Erin Archerd states: “I was really interested in how 
negative a reaction it sounded like most people were having to resolution sessions, which 
are a relatively recent innovation under the IDEA2004 authorization. They added in this 
resolution session. It sounded pretty universally unpopular on this panel.”). 
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commentators and advocacy groups noted a number of concerns.358  One 
concern was that the resolution session was an unnecessarily duplicative 
meeting that would take place only after a dispute had ripened between the 
parties.359  Another concern was that the resolution session, with its thirty 
day timeline, would delay resolution of a dispute.360  A third concern was 
that the resolution session would be used as a “pressure tactic” by school 
districts to pressure parents to settle the matter quickly.361   
While the concerns about duplication and delay remain valid,362 
additional concerns have arisen over the years.  There is the question 
whether the session is used to gain “free discovery” as noted by 
practitioners363 and others.364  A school district that is not interested in 
resolving a dispute nonetheless can compel the parents to meet with school 
officials and provide information about “the facts that form the basis of the 
[due process] complaint.”365  An additional concern is that any agreement 
reached in the resolution session can be voided in the days following the 
meeting.366  A third concern is that, because the resolution session takes 
place after a due process complaint is filed, the parties have the 
complicating issue of payment of attorneys’ fees if the parents have retained 
358 Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special Education Disputes:  
Any New IDEAs? 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 137 147-53 (2005) (detailing the concerns and 
objections of various organizations). 
359 Id. at 150 (quoting an online petition circulated by the League of Special Education 
Voters, which stated the group’s position that, by the type the resolution session is held, 
parents “have had countless meetings with the school, making little or no progress.  
Families must not be further burdened with extra meetings.”). 
360 Id. at 149-50 (quoting an analysis of the statutory amendments published by the 
Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), in which the CEC stated that the resolution 
session “could deny or delay a parent’s right to a hearing”). 
361 Id. at 148. 
362 In 2008, CADRE and Project Forum, conducted a survey of special education unit 
of state educational agencies.  Henderson, supra note 165.  The survey responses indicated 
a perception that the resolution session adversely affects the timing of dispute resolution, 
and that “[p]arties who are seeking a more speedy resolution are likely to waive the 
resolution meeting in favor of moving to mediation or a due process hearing immediately.”  
Id. at 13. 
363 See Part III.C., supra. 
364 Henderson, supra note 165, at 13; note 358, supra. 
365 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(B)(i)(IV) (2012).  Some school districts apparently do believe 
that pre-hearing meetings or settlement conferences are an opportunity to “receive 
feedback on the merits of their position and then somehow convince the opponent to back 
down or even withdraw their hearing request once they have heard how strong the case is 
for the other side.”  Gregory, supra note 253, at 441. 
366 See Comments of Esther Canty-Barnes, The Ohio State University Dispute 
Resolution in Special Education Symposium Panel, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 98 
(2014) (noting that, in New Jersey, resolution session are “rarely held” perhaps because of 
the ability to void any agreements within three days after the meeting). 
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counsel.367  
Finally, the resolution session takes place too late in the process to 
enable the parties to openly discuss their disagreements and resolve the 
matter.  By the time the resolution session is held, one party or another – but 
most often parents368 – shifted their focus from negotiation to litigation.369  
In addition, some parents have retained counsel, a complicating factor in 
terms of both the litigious nature of the meeting and the payment of 
attorneys’ fees. 
For these reasons, the resolution session should be scrapped in favor of 
a system of IEP facilitation.  A facilitated IEP meeting essentially is a 
“resolution session” with certain advantages.  First, a facilitated IEP 
meeting will occur before the dispute has ripened to the point where one 
party has filed a due process complaint.  Ideally it will take place at an early 
stage of the parties’ interactions with one another, before there have been 
too many fruitless and contentious meetings.  Second, the presence of the 
facilitator, if that individual is well-trained, should ensure that the lines of 
communication remain open.  With an orderly, facilitated IEP meeting, the 
parents may be more confident that the school district will conscientiously 
implement any agreed-upon IEP.    Third, pre-due process filing of IEP 
facilitation will reduce the need to retain counsel and file due process, 
thereby eliminating the current issue of payment of attorneys’ fees for work 
done by parents’ counsel up to the resolution session.   
Finally, eliminating the resolution session also will shorten the timeline 
for resolving a filed due process complaint by thirty days.  This is an 
advantage because allows for a quicker resolution of those disputes that 
require an adjudicated decision.  Not every special education dispute can be 
resolved by informal means, and the use of informal means should not be 
allowed to be used to delay a due process hearing when one is necessary to 
resolve the matter. 
 
367 Id. at 103 (comments of Professor Dinerstein to the effect that attorneys 
representing parents and children in the District of Columbia believe that the District of 
Columbia Public School System uses the resolution session to “buy more time” in the 
process). 
368 Gregory, supra note 253, at 440 (“School districts are most often on the receiving 
end of due process hearing requests filed by parents who are dissatisfied with special 
education services and/or placements….”). 
369 As one practitioner noted:  “[O]nce a case moves to mediation or due process, it is 
necessarily adversarial at that point and it is difficult to get the parents and the District 
"back on the same page" for the remainder of the student's time in the District.”  Another 
practitioner stated: “Rarely have I had a client come to me that just did not understand what 
the District was offering and just could not get his/her views heard due to 
misunderstanding.  By the time they get to me - a parent attorney - they have given up on 
the collaborative  process.”   
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C.  Eliminate the Two-Tier Administrative Structure 
 
Eliminating the option for a two-tier system is another structural change 
that would both increase the efficiency of due process and decrease costs.  
At the time that the EAHCA was passed, the second level of appeal was 
criticized by some as unnecessary.370  The two-tiered process was justified 
on several grounds.  First, it was argued that the two-tier system allowed the 
state educational agency to enforce the statutory provisions for which it was 
responsible.371  In addition, members of Congress apparently believed that 
the “state administrative appeals process … afford[ed] a timely, fair system 
for resolving conflicts.”372  In the view of Congress, this administrative 
appeal process actually would reduce “the number of cases going to court,” 
thus relieving parents of the “heavy financial burden of going to court.”373   
But perhaps the primary reason for including a two-tier system in the 
EAHCA was simply that several states, notably Pennsylvania, had created a 
two-tier structure even before passage of the EAHCA.374  As it had with the 
mechanics of due process notice and hearing, Congress copied a structure 
that already existed. 
A two-tier system, however, clearly increases costs and delay for the 
parties.  In two-tier jurisdictions, the second level of review could take sixty 
to seventy-five days to be completed.375  In addition to the time delay, the 
process is complex and onerous.  Take the process in New York as an 
example.  When a parent appeals a hearing officer’s decision to the second 
tier, the parent must prepare and serve a “Notice of Intention to Seek 
Review” upon the school district within twenty-five days of the hearing 
370 Stafford, supra note 49, at 78.  
371 Id. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 Id. 
375 Of the seven two-tier states in addition to New York, the time for the second level 
of appeal ranges from sixty to seventy-five days.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §115C-109.9 
(2006) (appeal to be filed within thirty days of the hearing officer decision; state review to 
be completed in thirty days); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(14)(b)(i) (2014) (appeal 
to be filed within forty-five days of the hearing officer decision; state review to be 
completed in thirty days); Nev. Adm. Code § 388.315 (appeal to be filed within thirty days, 
and state review to be completed thirty days later, although extensions of time may be 
granted);  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §91-40-51 (2008) (      _) 
(http://www.ksde.org/Portals/0/SES/forms/KSDE_IDEA_Part_B_ProcSafeguardsKansas.p
df); 707 K.A.R. 1:340 (2007) (thirty days to file appeal, with additional thirty days for 
decision).  S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243 (2015) (                              ) 
(http://www.acs.k12.sc.us/cms/lib3/SC01001719/Centricity/Domain/31/Procedural%20Saf
eguards.pdf). 
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officer decision.376  Not less than ten days later, but within thirty-five days 
of the hearing officer’s decision, the parent must prepare and serve a 
“Petition for Review” on the school district.377  The Petition for Review 
also must be filed with the Office of State Review of the State Education 
Department, along with a copy of the notice described above and proof of 
service upon the opposing party.378 The opposing party then has ten days to 
file an answer to the petition.379  Both the petition and the answer may be up 
to twenty pages in length and must conform to certain pleading standards, 
including specific requirements for citation to the record.380  The state level 
review officer has thirty days to issue a decision, although extensions of 
time may be granted.381  As part of its review, the State Review Officer 
might seek additional evidence or testimony or direct that the parties appear 
for oral argument.382    
The comments of the survey respondents make clear that a great 
majority of special education disputes (in which a due process hearing is 
held0 will not be fully resolved until after the case has been heard in federal 
court.  If it is truly the practice that the majority of cases will in any event 
be filed in federal court, then the second level of review in a two-tier 
structure does not serve as a meaningful filter to reduce filings in federal 
court.  Without that benefit, the second level of review serves only to 
increase cost and cause delay. 
Perhaps it is the burden and delay that has caused the states to 
increasingly prefer a one-tier structure.  In 1988, twenty-four states and the 
District of Columbia had two-tier systems.383  Since that time, the states 
overwhelmingly have moved from a two-tier system a one-tier system.  
Today, just eight states still retain a two-tier system.  Pennsylvania, an early 
architect of the two-tier structure, moved to a one-tier system in July 
2008.384 
376 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.2 (2008).  The notice is provided to the 
school district in order that it can prepare a written transcript of the hearing and forward to 
the Office of State Review of the New York State Education Department the transcript, the 
hearing officer’s decision, and all exhibits used as evidence in the hearing. Id. 
377 Id. 
378 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.4(a). 
379 8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.5.  The petition for review and answer 
may be up to twenty pages in length.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.8.  The 
New York regulations contain detailed requirements for the form of these documents, 
including the manner of citations to the record.  Id.   
380 Id. 
381 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(k) (2014). 
382 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.10; NYSED, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, 
Filing an Appeal, http://www.sro.nysed.gov/filing.html (last updated July 12, 2011). 
383 Zirkel, supra note 62, at 4. 
384 Id. at 7. 
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Indeed, eliminating the second tier would ease the burden on state 
educational agencies in two-tier states which, under the current system, 
must (a) promulgate rules for procedure, (b) provide parents with 
information and forms about the second level, (c) receive and process 
appeals that have been filed, and (d) hire, train, and pay second level review 
officers.  If the second tier were eliminated, those state educational agencies 
could shift resources away from managing the second tier to improving the 
quality of service provided in the first tier, an improvement in quality that 
appears to be needed in some current two-tier jurisdictions.385  Indeed, the 
quality of hearing decisions at the first level of review might improve 
greatly if the “backstop” of a second level of review was eliminated.   
Eliminating the two-tier structure thus could have multiple benefits both 
to the parties in a special education dispute and the state educational 
agencies responsible for managing the due process system.      
 
D.  Do Not Create Additional Layers in the Structure  
 
I also recommend that no additional ADR proceedings be “layered” into 
the due process structure.  Additional layers increase cost and delay, reduce 
trust in the process, and divert the resources of state agencies.  A 
streamlined, well-managed system will produce better results than a 
fractured, multi-option system. 
In particular, the arbitration proposal is an unnecessary addition to due 
process.  Both arbitration and due process are adjudication models in which 
an impartial decision maker determines the merits of the parties’ positions 
and, if necessary, a future course of conduct.  Thus, arbitration is not a 
mechanism that would resolve a category of special education disputes that 
could not be resolved in a due process proceeding.  The essential 
differences between the two forms are (a) the ability to appeal to state or 
federal court; and (b) the benefit (offset by the cost) of having the case 
385 Colker, supra note 69, at 373 (noting lack of professionalism and poor quality in 
IHO decisions in Ohio).  The survey yielded comments from practitioners with experience 
in New York about lack of timeliness and professionalism with the second level of review 
in New York.  One such comment was: “[I]n the two tier system in NY, the NYS 
Education Department's Office of State Review considers appeals of decisions issued by 
impartial hearing officers. They typically have no more experience or expertise than the 
impartial hearing officer, yet freely overturn decisions without the benefit of actually 
seeing the testimony when making credibility determinations, and they are deemed to have 
"superior expertise in the field of education" so the federal courts defer to the decisions of 
the state review office - decisions issued by individuals with less experience than most of 
the impartial hearing officers, and certainly less than a federal judge. Moreover, the 
decisions of the NYS Office of State Review are late - we have cases nearing two years 
over due [sic].” 
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heard before a three-person panel rather than a single hearing officer.386   
There is little utility in requiring the states to design and maintain two 
separate adjudication tracks, particularly if Congress were to streamline due 
process by eliminating the second level of review.  The volume of due 
process hearings generally has been low.387  In the 2011-2012 school year, 
thirty-five states held five or fewer due process hearings.388  If IDEA 
required the states to offer arbitration, those thirty-five states would have 
been required to design and maintain two adjudicatory structures to handle a 
very small number of disputes.    
 In addition, the arbitration proposal outlined by Professor Rosenfeld 
could adversely affect unrepresented parents.  By proposing that no 
attorneys be present in the arbitration proceeding, Professor Rosenfeld’s 
proposal could seriously tilt the balance of power in favor of school districts 
over unrepresented parents.389  School districts surely will rely on counsel 
to prepare for an arbitration even if counsel cannot be present at the 
proceeding itself.  Over time, school officials also will develop expertise in 
conducting arbitrations.  Thus, parents who mistakenly believe that the 
absence of attorneys somehow levels the playing field will in fact be facing 
a very prepared opponent.  That scenario exacerbates, not redresses, the 
inequities of the current system in terms of the ability of unrepresented 
parents to effectively advocate for their child.  Those inequities would be 
even further exacerbated if unrepresented parents consented to the presence 
of the school district’s counsel at the proceeding.390 
This arbitration proposal also could increase the inequities that exist 
between those parents who cannot afford attorneys and those parents who 
can.  Parents who can afford attorneys will not choose arbitration because 
they can “purchase” two important items: (a) the benefit of their counsel’s 
advice during an adjudicated proceeding, and (b) the right to appeal an 
adverse decision.  Represented parents will opt for a traditional due process 
hearing.  Only those parents who cannot afford attorneys will opt for 
arbitration, a proceeding that will be presented to them as one that is cheap 
and fast.  Unrepresented parents thus will severely limit their appeal rights 
and appear without representation before a panel vested with “complete 
386 I recognize that Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal indicates the arbitration panel 
would take a more active role in examining witnesses and reviewing material than a due 
process hearing officer would do.  Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 560-61.  However, at the 
end of the proceeding, the arbitration panel functions as a due process hearing officer in 
terms of granting relief that would be “final and binding.”  Id. at 554. 
387 Weber, supra note 14, at 508-09. 
388INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347. 
389 The prohibition on the presence of attorneys is meant to “redress the inherent 
inequity of unrepresented parents.”  Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 559. 
390 Id. at 554. 
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discretion”391 on important topics such as the use and scope of witness 
testimony or documents,392 all the while facing a very prepared opponent.   
Finally, the arbitration model almost surely will give rise to collateral 
proceedings, particularly on the issue whether unrepresented parents truly 
gave knowing and voluntary consent to opt for a proceeding from which 
they had no right of appeal.  Professor Rosenfeld himself acknowledges that 
it will be a “difficult question”393 to determine whether consent to 
arbitration was truly informed and voluntary.  That collateral issue itself 
could seriously undermine the ability of an arbitration model to bring about 
a quick resolution of a dispute. 
The AASA proposal for a mandatory IEP consultant is another form of 
special education dispute resolution that should not be adopted.  First, it 
must be noted that the AASA does not propose to add this consultancy 
model as an additional dispute resolution mechanism; rather, the AASA 
proposes a wholesale replacement of the due process system of which the 
consultancy model is one aspect.394  To the extent, however, that one would 
be inclined to pull that piece out of the AASA proposal and add it to IDEA 
as an additional ADR mechanism, I recommend against it. 
The AASA says that its consultancy proposal is “similar to” a dispute 
resolution program available in Massachusetts called the “SpedEx” 
program.395  The differences between SpedEx and the AASA proposal, 
however, are huge.  The SpedEx program is a voluntary program that the 
parties may agree to use or abandon at any time after an IEP has been 
rejected by the parents.396  Parents do not lose any right to proceed with due 
process at any point.397  In addition, the parties are not required to accept 
the consultant’s proposal, although the proposal must be implemented if the 
parties do accept it.398  Perhaps most importantly, the Massachusetts 
SpedEx program is a little-used “ongoing experimental project.”399  In the 
2013-2014 school year, there was funding for just eight cases.400  
Unlike the voluntary SpedEx program, the AASA proposal would 
mandate the use of an IEP consultant.  Requiring that the parties implement 
a consultant-imposed IEP as a prerequisite to litigation suffers from several 
defects.  First, not every dispute involves the IEP or issues that can be 
391 Id. 
392 Id. at 559-60. 
393 Id. at 552. 
394 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 23. 
395 Id. 
396 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 23; Gregory, supra note 253, at 425-26. 
397 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 23. 
398 Gregory, supra note 253, at 426. 
399 Id. 
400 Id. 
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addressed by an IEP consultant.  Second, given the limited funding 
available in Massachusetts for this mechanism, one wonders about the cost 
to state educational agencies in hiring and paying private psychologists, 
educators or behavior analysts the consultancy fees necessary to implement 
this proposal for every special education dispute that involves a child’s IEP.  
For these reasons, no such mandatory program should be added to IDEA. 
Finally, Congress should resist proposals to add dispute resolution 
mechanisms that “eliminate the need for attorneys”401 or are “lawyer-
free.”402  While it is popular to blame lawyers for a variety of evils, this call 
to eliminate them from special education dispute resolution is misguided.  
First, school districts almost invariably will have the ability to consult with 
their counsel.  Parents with financial means also likely will seek legal 
counsel and, in most cases, will opt for the dispute resolution mechanism 
that allows them to rely on counsel.  Thus, encouraging a “lawyer-free 
system”403 only harms the most unsophisticated and least-resourced parents 
who really need the help.     
More importantly, however, good attorneys can help to resolve disputes 
quickly.  In the survey, one parent-child attorney commented:  “It has been 
my experience and the experience of other attorneys in the state, that the 
involvement of attorneys increases the probability that the case will be 
resolved.” School district attorneys also attest to the value of having 
attorneys in the process, as noted by the comment of one survey respondent:  
“The resolution sessions in most cases I have handled, when they were 
successful at resolving the dispute, had the lawyers in attendance. In my 
experience, lawyers for parents will not allow their clients to reach 
agreement at a resolution meeting unless and until the lawyer has approved 
the agreement (and the agreement includes a provision for payment of the 
attorney's fees).  It is more efficient if the case is going to get resolved to 
have the lawyers attend.  That's not how the IDEA was intended to work, in 
my view, but it is the practical reality.” 
Special education law involves complex legal questions, and the 
competent legal representation is anyone involved in the process.  To ensure 
both equity and efficiency, Congress should not choose a dispute resolution 
mechanism that would exclude good advisors from the process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The essential goal of special education dispute resolution is to 
resolve the matter quickly so that the child receives the proper education as 
401 Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 551. 
402 Pudelski, supra note 9, at 22. 
403 Id. 
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soon as possible.  To fulfill this goal, structure matters.  A fractured system 
with multiple avenues and options can cause delay, increase cost, and 
reduce trust in the process.  A streamlined, well-managed structure will 
produce sensible decisions at low cost and without delay, ensuring that, for 
the child with a disability, every day of school will count.   
 
